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1. Introduction and Overview
1.1. Introduction
Operating systems have changed in nature in response to demands of users,
and in response to advances in hardware and software technology. The purpose of
this paper is to trace the development of major themes in operating system design
from their beginnings through the present. This is not an exhaustive history of
operating systems, but instead is intended to give the reader the flavor of the dif
ferent periods in operating
systems'development. To this end, the paper will be
organized by topic in approximate order of development. Each chapter will start
with an introduction to the factors behind the rise of the period. This will be fol
lowed by a survey of the state-of-the-art systems, and the conditions influencing
them. The chapters close with a summation of the significant hardware and
software contributions from the period.
1.2. Overview
Ever since the earliest computers were developed, people have tried to max
imize their utilization. This desire led to the development of operating systems.
These systems were primitive batch monitors in their early form, which matured
into batch multiprogramming systems with the advent of interrupts. Multiprogram
ming systems became more complex as larger and faster storage systems became
available, and timesharing grew out of these multiprogramming systems. Virtual
memory was developed as a way to make these new storage technologies easily
available to users. As more people gained easy, simultaneous access to computers,
an awareness of the need for security grew. Concern over security has grown from
the protection of the system supervisor from careless users to the protection of a
distributed network from potentially hostile intruders. The concept of distributed
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systems first developed as an offshoot of multiprogramming as a way to increase
processing speed. It has now grown to include distant, independent computers
linked together to allow sharing of programs and data. These developments have
brought us to operating systems as we know them today.
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2. Early History
Ever since electronic computers were developed in the late 1940s, people have
looked for ways to make them more cost effective and easier to use. As
knowledge about computers grew and the industry advanced, the means for achiev
ing those goals became available. This chapter briefly traces the rise of automatic
supervisors: the predecessors of modern operating systems.
The first programmers were presented with the monumental task taking a
naked piece of computer hardware and making it do something useful. There were
no tools to help them; all they could do was program it by using numeric machine
code, enter the numbers by paper tape, and use the lights and switches on the con
sole to debug and run their programs. As can be imagined, this was a time con
suming and difficult task. Only a small population had the capability or inclination
to get involved in the process.
This phase in software's history didn't last long. It occurred to people that
the computer itself could be used to make programming easier. Granted, the com
puter required that instructions given it correspond to its internal representation,
but that didn't necessarily mean that people had to program that way. Instead of
programming in numbers, symbolic names could be given to the operations, and a
program would translate the symbols into their numeric equivalents. Thus the first
assemblers were born by the early 1950s.
Assemblers helped make programming easier, but there were still many
hardware specifics to be dealt with. Every programmer who wanted to use the
tape drive, line printer or any other input/output device had to include code to
drive those devices in his programs. Not only did everyone have to recreate the
I/O code, but the programs to control devices were complicated. Mistakes in I/O
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programming were the most common sources of error, and the most difficult to de
bug. One has to consider that the time to set up the job, and assemble and load
the program was many times longer than the time to run the job, especially if the
program failed on an early input operation. To reduce the burden on the program
mer and the time wasted debugging I/O drivers for commonly used devices, libraries
of standard subroutines to perform these functions were developed. The library
routines would be assembled with the rest of the program, and would be called to
do the I/O.
The advent of symbolic addresses facilitated the use of libraries. In the ear
liest days, all programs were written using absolute addresses. If a programmer
wanted to include someone else's subroutine in his program, the addresses in the
subroutine would have to be changed. Relative addressing eased the problem by as
suming that each routine started at address zero; and the system loader would add
an offset to each instruction address to form the assigned memory address. Sym
bolic addressing made programming simpler since names, independent of physical ad
dresses, could be used. The problem with absolute addresses (that the addresses
changed whenever the program changed) was automatically resolved by the assem
bler when using symbolic addresses. These facilities were in common use by the
middle 1950s.
By 1956 simple supervisor programs were being developed. If all the program
mers were going to use the library routines, it made sense to have them reside on
the machine so they would not have to be assembled with each job. The first su
pervisors were intended to force the user to use the library routines to control I/O.
Somewhat later supervisors added services to make job set up easier. Early
manual scheduling of the computer was inefficient. Programmers would schedule
time to run and debug their programs. While one programmer had the machine, it
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was not available to anyone else. Much of the time was spent setting up tapes
and card decks, loading the assembler and translating the program. If there were
no errors, the loader was brought in from tape and the user's program loaded into
memory. When the program did not work properly, the programmer spent time
thinking about a problem while the machine sat idle. Changing the program caused
the process to be repeated from the assembler stage; these iterations consumed
valuable time. Finally, when a programmer was done, the area would have to be
readied for the next user.
Even with production jobs, there was a period of many minutes when the
machine sat idle, while the operator changed tapes, and set up switches to prepare
for the next job. The early supervisors aimed at reducing the time wasted in this
way.
To achieve these goals, jobs were collected into batches. Cards would be
read onto a tape (an operation that could be done off line), and the tape would
provide input to the computer system. Tapes were much faster than card readers
and therefore better able to keep the processor busy. The system supervisor read
a job off the tape, processed it, and wrote the output to another tape for off line
printing. This process was repeated for each job on the tape. Operator interven
tion was only occasionally required to mount tapes as instructed by the supervisor.
The step up between jobs was kept low, as most of the information was on the
system input tape.
These supervisors performed other functions besides job sequencing. Resource
usage was monitored, providing accounting statistics. A command language provided
for several sequential job steps, such as assembly, loading and execution. Operator
communications routines provided the operator with a more uniform interface with
user programs.
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The increased programmer and machine productivity afforded by supervisors,
while representing a great step forward, was still far from optimum. First, the
early supervisors had no protection from user programs. A user program could
overwrite the supervisor, which caused time to be wasted in restoring the supervi
sor and the other programs in the batch stream. By 1957 hardware was being
designed to prevent such catastrophes.
Second, the tape drives were still slow relative to the speed of the processor,
forcing the processor to wait for the tape operation, to complete before continuing
with its computations. This meant that a significant portion of the processor's
capabilities were being wasted. The interrupting I/O channel, which appeared
around 1957, provided a means to reduce the wasted time. Interrupts allowed the
processor to send a command to a peripheral device, then return immediately to its
computation. The I/O would proceed without any need for intervention by the pro
cessor until it was completed; at that time the peripheral would interrupt the pro
cessor. If programs were carefully written, the time formerly spent waiting for
the I/O could be used for computations. Only some of the time was retrievable
however, since most programs needed the input data before- it became be avail
able. This time was a costly resource, providing an incentive to look for other
ways to overlap the use of the cpu.
This brings the history of computer software to the beginning of the rapid
rise of operating systems as we know them today.
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3. Multiprogramming and Timesharing Systems
3.1. Introduction
This chapter traces the development of multiprogramming concepts from their
infancy in the late 1950's, through their age of rapid growth in the early and mid
dle 1960's, until research interest in them dwindled in the late 1960's.
During this decade of research, multiprogramming systems developed from
simple user-controlled systems to automatically controlled multi-tasking systems.
Major development topics were methods of automated job scheduling and resource
allocation. Many systems were developed during this time period, representing dif
ferent stages of growth and implementation methods. Several systems, representing
major research efforts of long-range influence, were developed, among these was
CTSS from MIT which will be discussed in further detail.
3.2. Definition of Terms
The meaning of some terms have changed as computer science has evolved.
To minimize confusion the meaning, as used in this chapter, will be given.
Multiprogramming refers to the sharing of the cpu among several, possibly in
dependent, programs. The term, by itself, does not indicate the method in which
the sharing is implemented.
Timesharing refers to multiprogramming that is implemented so that each user
receives a regular interval of time in which to do some work. This is somewhat
different from the more contemporary interpretation that implies simultaneous user
interaction.
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An interactive system is one in which multiple users can access the system
simultaneously, via consoles, and it appears to each user that there are no other
users.
Multiprocessor refers to a system that contains more than one cpu, and those
cpus are so tightly coupled as to be transparent to the user.
3.3. Early Influences and Motivations
This phase in operating
systems' development was made possible by hardware
advances in the middle and late 1950s. Memory, while still a scarce resource, was
available in amounts that made a resident supervisor to control system components
feasible. Magnetic drums had been available for some time and magnetic disks
were becoming available, to provide relatively low cost, high speed storage to aug
ment the limited central memory. Peripherals had acquired some rudimentary in
telligence, so that they were capable of signaling the cpu when they required at
tention, through the use of interrupts. Removing the burden of I/O handling from
the cpu opened the door to multiprogramming and further developments.
The motivation for multiprogramming was primarily economic. The computers
available were very expensive and the cpu was spending much of its time doing
nothing. This lack of utilization was due in large part to the disparity in the
speeds of the cpu and the peripherals. Even when programmers attempted to over
lap I/O and computation in their programs only small improvements were achieved.
The natural conclusion was that the cpu time not used by one program could be
used by another. It was with this background that research into multiprogramming
systems started.
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3.4. Historical Development
3.4.1. Early Concepts
The earliest multiprogramming systems were essentially manual. The programs
to be run together were assembled onto a magnetic tape with explicit sequencing
information embedded in the programs. They were treated by the supervisor as one
large job [Crit63]. Unfortunately these programs were then bonded so tightly to
gether that all had to be reassembled if a change was made in any one of them.
It quickly became clear that the efficiences gained were canceled by the increased
complexity, and time spent recompiling. The complexity problem was made more
critical by the increased use of high level languages. High level languages removed
the machine characteristics from the realm of the programmer. However, to syn
chronize programs to efficiently use the cpu, the programmer had to be very fami
liar with the particular machine's features. These two trends were diametrically
opposed to each other. The value of high level languages was already fairly well
accepted by this time, so some other method of multiprogramming had to be dev
ised to remove the responsibility from individual programmers.
3.4.2. Early Supervisors
There were many parallel developments that influenced the ways in which
multiprogramming was implemented. In 1956 and 1957 the UNIVAC LARC and IBM
Stretch computers were under development. Both of these systems were highly
parallel machines, using interrupts to coordinate the operation of multiple cpus.
These systems prompted people designing multiprogramming systems to consider us
ing hardware techniques and interrupts to control the use of a single cpu by multi
ple users.
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One of the first attempts at machine controlled multiprogramming was the
TX-2 computer at Lincoln Labs [Clar57]. This system attempted to implement
multiprogramming almost entirely in hardware. The machine was equipped with 32
instruction counters: one for each possible program. There was a hardware
scheduler that determined which of the 32 programs, including systems programs,
would be executed next. There was no method of protecting the programs in
memory from each other. This system did not have a long lasting effect on mul-
tiprogrammed systems development, but is interesting in its approach and its posi
tion as a forerunner in the field.
The next publicized attempt at multiprogramming was the GAMMA-60 system
from France [Drey57]. This system is significant in that it was the first commer
cially available system with vendor supplied hardware and software for multipro
cessing and multiprogramming. The software supervisor was primitive, but it
represented vendor recognition of the need for software. The GAMMA-60 did not
achieve widespread acceptance or recognition.
In 1959, Strachey presented his paper "Time-Sharing in Large Fast Computers"
at the IFIP Congress [5tra59]. This was a milestone in that it was the first ma
jor paper devoted solely to the development of techniques to implement timeshar
ing. The ideas proposed influenced future systems, so a closer look at his ideas is
in order.
Strachey recognized that there were limitations on how much intelligence it
was feasible to put into hardware. The logical complexity of a system had direct
bearing on its cost, and the speed advantage to be gained was not that critical.
Inasmuch as the peripherals couldn't be completely autonomous, the cpu must be in
volved in their operation. Since the time required was so small, it would be prac
tical to borrow the cpu from the program using it. The peripheral would interrupt
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when it needed attention and the cpu would temporarily stop processing the user
program to execute a special sequence of instructions to handle the peripheral's re
quest.
The many types of peripherals, with widely differing speeds, necessitated dif
ferent classes of interrupts to indicate the nature of the request. If a high priori
ty interrupt was received, while already processing an interrupt, the lower priority
action would be suspended. All interrupt processing was based on priorities and
first-come first-served (FCFS) within priority classes. The interrupting program
would be responsible for saving and restoring any common registers that it used.
Some of these ideas had been considered in the design of the Stretch and LARC
t
computers, but had not been discussed in one place before this paper.
Strachey proceeded to develop some new concepts. His concerns were
motivated by the multifold speed increases coming with the new microsecond
machines. He feared that the increased capacity would be wasted without new
techniques to take advantage of it. To this end, he proposed a timesharing super
visor called the Director.
The purpose of the Director was to control the utilization of the cpu and its
peripherals, while supporting on-line debugging and on-line maintenance facilities.
The Director and its privileged instructions could be stored in a high speed, inex
pensive read-only memory (ROM) to protect it from the users. The Director pro
tected programs from potentially destructive interaction with other programs by
limit registers. These would confine users to their own area in memory. When a
program was selected to run, the Director would allocate memory for it and the
memory bounds be placed in the limit registers. All memory references would be
checked against the registers, in parallel with the memory operation. The Director
would be notified of any violations.
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The system would allow simultaneous operation of up to four job types.
There could be a low priority, long running "base load" program, that was run when
no other jobs were ready to run. The second job type was a queue of short to
medium length jobs, run in first-come, first-serve (FCFS) order. These programs
would have been assembled in an earlier compilation run. The third job type would
be a program being debugged on-line at a special console. On-line debugging was
affordable because there were other jobs to keep the processor busy while the pro
grammer thought. A maintenance program to help service the peripheral equipment
was the last job type. The Director controlled the input of programs from paper
tape for later storage on magnetic tape, and low speed output to terminals, in ad
dition to the four job types.
Strachey's ideas had varying impact on system development. The limit regis
ters and reserved instructions became widely adopted, as the need for some form
of memory protection had already been recognized. The concept of having the su
pervisory program in ROM was not widely accepted, with the notable exception of
the Manchester University Atlas System in 1961. However, his idea was a precur
sor of the concept of having a separate address space for the software supervisor.
Later researchers found different ways to implement it, as will be seen in subse
quent chapters.
The timesharing aspects of his Director were too restrictive to be generally
copied, but his work did provide a basis for further research into timesharing
methods. His idea of a base load program was the forerunner of
foreground/background systems. More sophisticated ways of determining job mix
and job scheduling were needed to further improve system utilization.
Strachey's proposed system typified the prevalent philosophy that machine util
ization was more important than programmer utilization. The major objective of
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his system was to make best use of the machine, with no regard for programmer
efficiency or turn around times. Jobs were run in FCFS order within program
group. There was only limited on-line access planned (one special console), indicat
ing that programmer time was not as critical as machine time.
The same year Strachey proposed a software based multiprogramming system
because of its cost and flexibility, Honeywell was announcing its H800. The H800
could support up to 8 simultaneous programs, with control of the multiprogramming
and scheduling in hardware, "without the use of cumbersome supervisory routines"
[Lour59]. This system did represent an improvement over Strachey's system: it
provided elementary round robin scheduling, that could be overridden by a user pro
gram. Like Strachey's proposed system, the H800's design was too limited in
scope, partly due the inflexibility of hardware implemented multiprogramming, to be
generally adopted.
1960 was a quiet year with no major announcements. Several models for
hierarchical control of computer resources were proposed [Baue60 and Ryck60].
The number of high level languages was increasing greatly, hardware was changing
and hardware failures were common. The environment that an operating system
controlled was increasingly dynamic. Static operating system designs were phased
out as the concepts of modular, flexible, layered operating systems were developed.
The objective was to make addition of new languages processors easier, to remove
device dependencies from the user, and to control the equipment effectively.
3.4.3. The Growth Years - 1961 to 1964
The period between 1961 and 1964 was one of tremendous interest and growth
in multiprogramming supervisors.
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The Manchester University Atlas system represented a great step forward.
The principal goal of the operating system was to maintain a balance between the
peripherals and the processing unit. The slow speed peripherals were fed into wells
in the central memory and magnetic drum. These wells were adaptations of the
buffers used in earlier generations of supervisors. If the program executing filled
the output well, it was suspended and a more compute bound job was selected for
execution. Before a job could be run, its inputs had to be available in the input
well. The objective was to overlap the input and output of other jobs with the
computation of the current job. The scheduling methods did not represent any ad
vance.
The feature that made Atlas significant was its concept of one-level store
[Kilb61]. This represented the first attempt to make the levels of storage and
their differences in speed transparent to the user. As such, Atlas represents the
first virtual memory system and these aspects will be described in the next
chapter.
The Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS), from MIT, represented the next
major step forward. This system's aim was to balance computer and programmer
efficiency through interactive timesharing, a radical change in approach. This pro
ject served as the starting point for most later interactive systems, and as such
deserves a close examination.
A prototype of CTSS was announced in 1962 which supported four users in a
foreground/background environment [Corb62]. Control of the foreground users was
the main effort and interest in this system. The background job function was that
of the base load program in Strachey's design.
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The service objectives of the system were to provide immediate response to
user keystrokes, and to respond to commands in time linearly proportional to the
number of users on the system. The software was to handle user accounting, user
I/O requests, and to provide a range of utility programs to simplify programming.
These utilities would include compilers, editors, post-mortem dump routines and
feedback methods for use during program runs. Ease of use and programmer effi
ciency were key goals of this operating system.
Hardware was needed to help achieve the software goals. In specific, memory
protection, dynamic memory relocation, an interval clock, and special I/O trap in
structions were required. Many of these features were not fully used by the proto
type operating system. Only one user, in addition to the supervisory programs,
would be allowed in memory at a time. The memory protection features were used
only to protect the supervisor from the user. With only one user the need for the
dynamic relocation capability was limited to interaction of the user program with
library subroutines. The I/O trap instructions were a means to force the user to
use the supervisor for I/O. The clock was used in the scheduling process.
CTSS's scheduling algorithm was one of its major contributions. It used a
multi-level priority, time-sliced method to allocate the cpu. As each job entered
the system, it was assigned to a priority queue based on program size. The formu
la used in this determination was
q = l_lg2 (wp/wq + 1)J
where wp is the number of words in the program and wq is the number of words
that can be transferred between the memory and drum in one quantum.
The queue numbers were prioritized in reverse number order, with low
numbers being higher priority. To determine which job to run next, the scheduler
picked the first job from the lowest occupied queue and set the clock interval for
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quanta, where q is the queue's level number. If the job was not completed at
the end of that time, it was placed at the end of the next higher numbered queue.
The process repeated with the scan for the lowest occupied queue. When a new
job entered the system, another scan was initiated. If the new job had a lower
queue level than the currently executing job, and that job had already used as
much time as the new job would receive, the current job was suspended. If a job
changed its memory size at any time, its new queue number and interval was
determined and applied retroactively.
The algorithm maintained an acceptable level of service even when the system
reached saturation. It ensured that a program would receive at least as much time
in service as it took to swap it in. That way the computational efficiency never
fell below one-half. It also allowed a computer facility to determine the maximum
number of users it could support, given a desired response time limit. Other ad
vantages of this algorithm were that program size and cpu requirements were
measured automatically by the system, and not estimated by the user, as was stan
dard at the time. The algorithm also responded to changes in program characteris
tics.
CTSS grew from its four user prototype to a 110 console system by 1965
[Cris65]. The system was still based on the foreground/background concept, but
with an obvious growth in the number of supportable foreground users. Hardware
advances helped make this growth possible. The availability of large capacity, high
speed disks made swapping faster, allowing more concurrent users. The increased
memory sizes made it feasible to keep more than one user in memory.
On the 1965 system, there were two banks of memory, one for the operating
system and one for the users. Memory protection was implemented via two protec
tion registers, whose contents were used as limits on every user memory access.
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There was a relocation register that acted as base address register, modifying every
memory access to simplify dynamic program relocation. This in turn gave the sys
tem flexibility in swapping. All memory allocations were based on blocks of con
tiguous memory locations. The supervisor was responsible for finding a block of
memory large enough to hold the program, and swap out programs as necessary to
make space.
Other features that were added during the development of CTSS were the
ability to run jobs in foreground mode while detached from the user terminal, pass
words for accessing the system and private files, an interconsole message capabili
ty, public disk files and an on-line user manual.
The CTSS developers had hoped to eliminate the foreground/background en
vironment, and with it the differentiation between on-line and batch jobs. They
never implemented this change, as many of the early pioneers on this project had
moved on to other projects.
CTSS is the most remembered system of that time period, but there were
others that added to the collective knowledge. Burroughs had developed AOSP, An
Operating System Program, that acknowledged the known timesharing concepts.
The most interesting point about this system was that it performed confidence
checks on itself when the cpu was idle. Considering the questionable reliability of
computer systems at that time, it seemed an intelligent use of excess processor
time.
Another system that came not long after CTSS was TSS from Software
Development Corp [Schw64]. This was a batch system, unlike CTSS. TSS had an
interesting scheduling algorithm which was regulated by the number of users on the
system. It was based on the concept of a minimum quantum and a cycle time.
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The minimum quantum was established by the installation manager and was used
when the system was under maximum load. The cycle time was time available for
one complete pass through all the active jobs on the system. When not under max
imum load, the quantum used was the cycle time divided by the current number of
active jobs. If a job did not use its entire quantum, the excess time was distribut
ed among the other users.
Jobs were assigned priorities as they became active, based on the program
size and the type of I/O devices it required. The memory was partitioned into
four memory banks. Bank 1 held the operating system, Banks 2 and 3 were used
for medium and low priority jobs and Bank 4 for high priority jobs. The system
favored small jobs, as large jobs may have required all three user memory banks.
Inter-user protection was provided only a bank basis.
To facilitate swapping jobs in and out of memory the supervisor had a space
allocation algorithm for the drum. Object programs were kept as contiguous
storage locations, so they could be quickly and easily be transferred into memory
when needed. Each time a new job entered the system, all empty spaces left by
completed programs were collected together and an inventory of the space was
made before assigning the new job a location.
3.4.4. The Close of the Era - 1965 to 1968
By 1965 the principles of multiprogramming were well established. The need
for protection, relocation, reentrancy, scheduling and storage allocation methods
were recognized and various solutions had been implemented. The following years
were years of refinement of the techniques proposed and investigation into new
areas.
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The only implementation project of significant interest during this period was
developed in 1968. This was THE Multiprogramming System by Edsger Dijkstra in
the Netherlands [Dijk]. The significance of this system was the approach taken
towards programming in general. The entire system was viewed as a collection of
parallel sequential processes.
These processes could cooperate through explicit mutual synchronization state
ments. Each process works at its own speed, and if necessary waits for another
process to give it information before it continues. To implement this concept
Dijkstra promoted the use of semaphores, and synchronization primitives to act
upon them. The semaphores are integer variables allocated within the universe of
the processes. The primitives increase and decrease the value of the semaphore via
the primitives, which are uninterruptable actions. This allowed the system to de
fine critical sections, which could be used to examine and modify state variables,
without fear of the states being changed after the check by another process.
Breaking a large program into a group of smaller cooperating processes could
be used as an aid in the resource allocation problem. The memory requirements
for the individual pieces were fairly small, and more easily satisfied than for one
large program. Also there was no special hardware required beyond that which was
used to implement multiprogramming. These concepts have been used on all types
of machines.
The concepts of mutual exclusion by use of semaphores has been widely
adopted, as has the idea of cooperating processes, as shall be seen in subsequent
chapters. The widespread acceptance of the concepts presented make THE a signi
ficant contribution to operating systems research.
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It is not fair to assume that no other work was done on multiprogramming
systems after 1965. The systems discussed in this chapter were primarily research
projects, that contributed greatly to the knowledge base, but were not commercially
successful. The honor of commercial successfulness belongs to IBM with the Sys
tem 360 and OS/360 and its many offspring [Meal66]. These software products
had few new technological advances, but because of IBM's stature in the computer
industry, helped the ideas of multiprogramming become universally accepted.
3.5. Contributions of the Era - 1957 to 1968
This period in operating systems design contributed greatly to the collective
knowledge of computer science. The techniques developed served as the basis for
further research, that eventually lead to even better methods. Many concepts forT
mulated during this period are still used today, as will be shown below.
Hardware and software contributions are sometimes difficult to differentiate.
Hardware refinements were often prompted by new software demands. These same
refinements made many of the software concepts feasible and lead in turn to new
developments.
3.5.1. Hardware Refinements
Memory sizes and speeds increased over the period, making new ideas practi
cal. Memory protection, in the form of limit registers and other techniques, be
came commonly available. Increases in the transfer rates and capacities of disks
made them usable for swapping.
Interrupt capabilities were enhanced to take the burden away from the
software. There were multi-level priority interrupts, that identified the nature of
the device and its request. Certain registers, such as the program counter, were
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automatically stored when an interrupt occurred. On many machines there was a
special supervisor mode for executing certain privileged instructions. The system
switched into this mode automatically when an interrupt occurred. This mode pro
vided a separate address space for the supervisory program. These advances made
the interrupt processing faster and more secure, allowing the sophistication of the
operating system to grow without degrading performance.
Sophisticated methods of relocation made swapping user jobs easier, as the
programs now could be placed in any available memory locations. This also made
it easier to use system library routines.
3.5.2. Software Refinements
There were many general concepts developed in this period. The idea of an
operating system providing a wide range of utilities grew up out of simple I/O su
pervisors. People started to expect an operating system to provide many services,
to make using the computer less of a chore. The attitude towards computing went
from computing for its own sake to computing as a workable method of problem
solving. The areas of greatest contribution were in scheduling and storage alloca
tion techniques.
3.5.2.1. Scheduling
When monitors first came out, jobs were serviced in first-come first-served
(FCFS) order. Priorities, if required, were established manually by placing critical
jobs first in the deck. Early multiprogramming systems approached the scheduling
problem in much the same way. It was soon discovered that this was not neces
sarily the most efficient way in which to use the computer.
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Many different techniques were developed at approximately the same time,
many of which are still in use. Priority schemes include shortest job first (SJF),
highest priority first (HPF), round robin and feedback queues. The first two
methods are self explanatory. Round robin scheduling implies that each job is ser
viced in a rotating sequence. In a feedback queue, priority is determined by the
amount of service received: the entering job is assigned highest priority and as it is
serviced, its priority decreases. This ensures that each entering job receives at
least as much service as the least serviced job in the system. There are other
categorizations of scheduling methods as well.
There are non-preemptive scheduling techniques in which the current job con
tinues until the end of its allowed time, even if a higher priority job has come into
the system in that time. There are preemptive techniques in which the current job
is suspended upon arrival of a higher priority job. The definition of higher priority
is dependent on what priority scheme (SJF, HPF, etc.) is used. In preemptive sys
tems there is a choice of how to handle the job being preempted. Some systems
throw out the results of the preempted program, forcing it to restart later, or
flushing it from the system totally. This technique is rarely used today, but in the
early days hardware limitations sometimes forced this method to be used. The pre
ferred method of handling preemption is to save the preempted job's environment,
and restore it when that job is scheduled to run again.
The availability of information for scheduling is another issue. If a system
uses SJF for example, how does it determine the length of a job? This information
is needed to determine what job to run next. That information can be provided by
the user, or it can be determined automatically by the system, with additional help
from the compilers. The problem with users specifying job requirements, such as
cpu time and peripheral resources required, is that they generally don't have the
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information. These requirements may vary during the execution of a program, and
the system would always be making its decisions based on worse case situations.
Automatic techniques allow the system to respond to changes in program require
ments, but they require more software sophistication. However, because there is
no a priori knowledge of a program's behavior, there are no checks on a runaway
program with automatic techniques.
Scheduling techniques can also be classified as static or dynamic. Static im
plies that the scheduling method does not vary with different loads or situations.
An example of a static technique would be a round robin scheduler with a fixed
length quantum. Regardless of the system load, the service relationship to each
user remains the same. There are many dynamic scheduling strategies: some in
volve dynamic quantum determination, based on what happened in the previous
quantum. Others depend on the amount of service a user has already received, or
how much service a user has received compared to other users.
Some scheduling methods are designed to order jobs to minimize swapping,
maximize memory utilization, or favor a particular class of job. Some methods are
best suited for light to medium loads, such as pure round robin. Others are well
adapted to gracefully degrade under heavy loads, such as the CTSS multi-level
priority scheduler.
Almost all operating system schedulers use a combination of these techniques
depending upon the anticipated user environment. This way the heart of the
operating system can be adapted to handle user needs.
3.5.2.2. Resource Allocation
The primary concern of resource allocation schemes is the efficient use of
memory. In a multiprogramming system memory is a critical resource and was
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especially so in the days of small memories. A number of methods were developed
in this period to handle this problem.
Before relocation hardware was readily available, all program addresses were
bound within the program, thus locking programs into particular memory locations.
This made sharing programs difficult and multiprogramming impractical. This could
be partially overcome either by assigning users to particular blocks of memory or
allow only one program in memory at a time and use swapping to affect multipro
gramming. This was not a very efficient use of system resources.
When memory relocation hardware became standard, a number of things hap
pened. The binding of symbolic addresses was moved from programming time to
either load time or to the time of reference. Supervisory programs had more flex
ibility in allocating storage since programs were address independent. With this ca
pability, it was feasible to run multiple programs in memory simultaneously, since
they could be located anywhere without ill effect. If the address binding was
dynamic, this afforded even more flexibility in that the programs could be moved
about in memory as needed. If the address binding was at load time, the program
had to use those memory locations for the duration of its run.
The hardware influenced how memory allocation was handled in another way.
Almost all the systems mentioned allocated memory as contiguous blocks. This was
due to the hardware protection devices. Most machines had only a pair of limit
registers for a protection mechanism. Unless a program was allocated a contiguous
block of memory, there was no way to implement memory protection. The need
for memory protection was well established, and not to be abandoned in favor of
more efficient memory allocation. Within this constraint of contiguous memory al
location, there are many ways to handle the details.
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The simplest method is static partitioning, such as that used in IBM's OS/360.
Each partition is a fixed size, and in a fixed location, as chosen by the installation
manager. When a job is to be swapped into memory, a partition of sufficient size
is found. Each partition has associated with it in-use indicators and only one job
can reside in a partition. Unfortunately this technique wastes space as jobs are
rarely the exact partition size, and in fact may be significantly smaller than the
partition. It also presumes that the job characteristics of a user group are known
in advance and are static.
Another method is dynamic partitioning, in which memory is divided into par
titions each of which represents a user program. Each partition has only one job,
and each has a status indicator associated with it. A list of available partitions is
kept by the operating system, so that when a job enters the system a place can be
found for it.
There are several ways to chose which partition to give a job. One method
is the first fit algorithm, in which the list of free space is kept in address order.
When a job comes in, the list is scanned, and the first available partition that will
fit is used. The algorithm tends to load the low memory addresses with small jobs,
leaving larger blocks in high memory for large jobs. Another technique is the best
fit algorithm, in which the free list is kept in order by size. The first partition in
the list that fits the job is chosen. This guarantees that the smallest possible par
tition is selected, tending to leave large unbroken areas for large jobs. The advan
tages of a dynamic approach to memory allocation are that it assumes no prior
knowledge of the job characteristics, and it responds to changes in environment.
Unfortunately both these algorithms tend to fragment memory. For the free
memory locations to be useful, they need to be collected together. This process is
known as compaction or shuffling. Jobs present in the system are moved, as
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necessary, to eliminate gaps in allocated memory. The free space is then in one
block and considered one partition. Compaction, if used often, can severely impact
the system performance as it is a time consuming process.
The obvious problem was that the contiguous memory requirement impeded ef
ficient use of memory. Other methods were developed to neutralize this problem,
called segmentation and paging. These methods will be discussed in the virtual
memory chapter. Many of the methods described are still in use, especially on
minicomputers that do not have the hardware needed for virtual memory.
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4. Virtual Memory Systems
4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the development of virtual memory operating system
concepts. Virtual memory systems began in the early 1960's with the Atlas Sys
tem. They developed in complexity and capability through the mid to late 1960's;
by the early 1970's they were an accepted design technique and research interest in
them dwindled.
The concepts developed during this period centered on more effective ways to
handle storage allocation, protection, and sharing of common information within a
multiprogramming system. Several systems represent the major developments of
the first half of the period, notably the Manchester University Atlas system and
MIT's Multics system. The second half of the period was devoted to studying the
techniques available to manage virtual memory, and developing models to determine
which were most efficient. The major developments of each period will be dis
cussed in further detail.
4.2. Definition of Terms
To discuss any concept, a common vocabulary must be established; some gen
eral terms are defined here to minimize confusion.
Virtual memory is the set of storage locations in physical memory and secon
dary storage that are referred to by a common address space. To the programmer
all addresses appear to be in physical memory. A virtual memory system is one
that presents this view of memory to a programmer via hardware and software
techniques.
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Segmentation is a method of implementing virtual memory in which a
program's address space is regarded as a collection of named segments. A segment
is logically a collection of information important enough to be given a name; physi
cally a segment consists of a contiguous set of addressable locations.
Paging is a method of implementing virtual memory in which a program's ad
dress space is divided automatically into fixed length blocks of contiguous ad
dresses. These fixed length blocks are called pages, and usually have a size
between 256 and 4096 words. Page frames are pages in main memory. Paging and
segmentation can be used separately or in combination.
A process is a collection of program procedures and data operating together
to perform some task.
4.3. Early Influences and Motivations
This phase of operating systems development partially overlapped the develop
ment of multiprogramming systems. The factors that influenced development of
the earliest virtual memory system, Atlas, were much the same as those which
motivated development of multiprogramming systems. These factors were the
economic necessity of efficient machine utilization, coupled with a desire to make
that process transparent to the user.
Small memories, and a need to share the cpu among several programs to in
crease utilization, created an awareness of the need for sharing common pro
cedures. This was not easily done using the common memory allocation scheme of
assigning contiguous memory addresses to a program. That technique also presented
problems in memory allocation for a multiprogrammed system. Entire programs had
to be transferred to and from secondary storage if there was not enough memory
for all programs to run simultaneously. If there was enough memory, but not in
4-2
contiguous locations, the free space had to be redistributed by moving programs in
memory; even this technique would not work if dynamic relocation of programs was
not supported.
In the early 1960's, when Atlas was developed, main memories were very
small; programs could easily be larger than the available memory space. Some sys
tems overcame this problem by requiring that the user structure his programs so
that unrelated sections could write over each other. This process is referred to as
overlaying. This put the responsibility for storage management within a program on
the programmers; any changes in storage size necessitated a change in the overlay
structure to keep machine utilization high. The increased use of high level
languages made this process more difficult, in that the user was removed from
many of the machine details by the language, including factors such as memory
usage. The purpose of virtual memory on the Atlas was to make memory overlay
ing the responsibility of the operating system and transparent to the user. This
would provide a level of abstraction between the details of the computer's storage
levels and the users, allowing a degree of configuration and device independence
previously not available.
4.4. Historical Development
4.4.1. Early Concepts
If one considers virtual memory to be the extension of a program's address
space beyond the size of the physical memory available, then manual overlays
represent the first virtual memory systems. Memory locations were mapped by the
user to more than one program address. This was achieved by breaking the pro
gram into logical segments and having the segments brought into memory only when
they were needed. Segments that were unrelated could time-share the same
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memory locations.
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This technique was capable of giving the illusion of almost unlimited memory,
but was difficult and clumsy to use. One major problem was that the overlays
were created to run in a particular minimum memory size: if the available memory
was decreased, through hardware changes or an increase in the operating system
size, the overlay structure had to be altered to run in the reduced space. The
man and machine time involved to do this reduced the overall efficiency. Some
automatic way of handling program segmentation and memory allocation was need
ed.
4.4.2. Early Systems
The Manchester University Atlas system in 1961 marked the start of virtual
memory systems as we now know them [Howa63, Kilb61, Kilb62]. The technique
was known then as one-level storage ; the term virtual memory came much later.
The original purpose of the operating system, and its one-level store, was to
minimize system idle time. To achieve that goal the operating system had a
scheduler that tried to always to have at least 2 jobs on a list of active jobs. The
small memory size did not always allow the active jobs to be entirely resident, and
swapping entire jobs involved too much overhead.
The method used to solve the problem was to break all random access
storage, including the drum, into pages of 512 words. An instruction address re
ferred to the combined core and drum storage of the machine. Associated with
each of the pages in memory was a Page Address Register (PAR) that indicated
which logical block of information occupied that page frame. When a memory
reference was made, the hardware attempted to find a match between the instruc
tion address and an address in one of the PARs. This search, called an equivalence
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check, was done through all 32 PARs simultaneously to minimize the associated
overhead.
To reduce the overhead even further, the PAR mechanism was effectively
bypassed on instruction fetches. It was assumed that most instruction accesses
would be within the same page, so a request would be made using the word index
of the instruction address and the page number of the last instruction. In parallel
with the request, an equivalence check would be made, plus an additional check to
be sure that the instruction was actually within the same page as the last instruc
tion. The memory request would be canceled if either check indicated the wrong
word was being accessed, and a new request for the correct word would be made.
This concept of nearby accesses is known as program locality.
During an equivalence check, if the hardware did not find the address request
ed in one of the PARs, a non-equivalence interrupt (page fault) was generated.
When that happened a drum transfer from the block indicated in the referenced ad
dress was initiated. The transfer copied the page from the drum to an empty page
in main memory. An empty page was always available; if the last empty page was
used, an occupied page was written out to the drum.
The choice of which occupied page to write to drum and was handled by a
special monitoring routine. Each page in memory had an in use bit associated with
it, and every 1024 instructions the bits were copied into a list. When a page was
to be chosen for removal, the monitor calculated the length of time since each
block was last used (t) and the length of the last period of inactivity for each
block (T). The last period of inactivity was the length of time, before the last ac
cess, that the page was not referenced; when a page was transferred into memory,
T was set to zero. The page to be swapped out was chosen by the formula
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t > T + 1
or t 0 and (T-t)max
or Tmax and all t = 0
This means that the page was chosen, if possible, from pages whose time
since last reference was greater than the last period of inactivity. . If there were
no pages that fit that criterion, the next choice would be from those pages not in
use and with a maximum difference between last use and latest period of inactivi
ty. The last choice was a page from those that were currently in use with the
longest last period of inactivity. This algorithm guaranteed that if a page was
chosen for swap out and was then referenced immediately, the page would not be
chosen for swap out on the next cycle, since its latest period of inactivity would
be zero. This technique was said to be as good as an experienced programmer in
choosing which page to swap out, with the additional benefit that it would take
into account the dynamic state of the machine, whereas a programmer would not
have access to that information.
This addressing mechanism had many advantages. First, the users were shield
ed from the intricacies of the multiple storage levels of the system, and their as
sociated speed differences. Second, only those pages being used by a program
needed to be in memory; this actually allowed more flexibility in the number of
jobs that could be in memory simultaneously. This flexibility, in turn, increased
the choices available to the scheduler for jobs to run, so that it could do a better
job of balancing the input, output and computation loads. The memory allocation
routine was much simpler because programs were no longer address dependent, and
could be moved to any convenient location in memory.
With this additional freedom, and the ability to run multiple simultaneous jobs
came additional responsibility. User programs could not be allowed to interfere
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with each other or with the operating system. Each page had associated with it a
lock-out bit; when set, this bit prevented access to the page by the cpu. The su
pervisor kept a list of all pages belonging to a program, and all pages not on the
list were locked out, thus preventing users from accessing other
users'
pages. The
supervisor protected its main memory pages in the same way, although most of the
supervisor was in read-only memory (ROM) or in subsidiary storage which could not
be accessed by the user.
Atlas represented a major step forward, both in . its handling of resource allo
cation and multiprogramming. It was the most sophisticated system of its time,
and it was several years before any significant advances were made in virtual
memory systems. Several systems built upon Atlas's multiprogramming ideas, as
discussed in the previous chapter.
Burroughs developed the B5000 system in that same year (1961) and it too im
plemented a form of virtual memory [Lone61]. The B5000 was attempting to
solve many of the same problems that the Atlas tackled.
The B5000 provided automatic program segmentation, allowing program size to
be independent of physical memory size. The system could then handle global
resource allocation and scheduling more efficiently than individual programmers.
The compilers divided a program into variable length segments. Each program had
its own set of program descriptors, each giving the drum location of a segment, a
base address in memory and in "in
core" indicator. If a reference was made to a
segment not in core, it would automatically be brought in by the Master Control
Program. Programs were fully relocatable since they only referenced entries in the
Program Reference Table. This gave the Master Control Program more flexibility
in memory allocation, and increased the number of jobs simultaneously in core.
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Until about 1965 there was little visible activity in virtual memory research.
The successor of CTSS at MIT heralded the beginning of the key years in virtual
memory research.
4.4.3. The Growth Years - 1965 to 1970
Multics (1965) was the first major virtual memory system after Atlas [Bens72,
Dale68, Orga72, Ossa65, Vyss65].
Multics'
goal was to become a commercially vi
able operating system; it achieved this goal, and it is still used today. This goal
colored the functional requirements, design, and implementation of the system. To
be a commercially feasible timesharing system, it had to provide continuous service.
This meant that the software had to be flexible enough to handle dynamic changes
in the hardware configuration. In addition, the software itself had to be reliable.
These requirements led to a modular operating system design. The system had
to allow easy addition of language processors and utility programs. It also had to
be constructed so that key operating system functions, such as scheduling, memory
allocation, and I/O handling could be easily modified, to keep up with anticipated
changes in machine and user environments. As a research project, the designers
wanted to be able to test new techniques and to take advantage of other research
ers'
developments, without disrupting the large user community. A modular operat
ing system design would allow sections of code to be replaced, without affecting
the operation of the rest of the system. The modular design was made easier to
implement by the use of PL/I.
Reliability implied that the operating system had to be able to recover from
hardware malfunctions. This required a flexible approach to device handling, so
devices could be excluded or included in the configuration as their status dictated.
Part of the flexibility needed was device independence, so that users would not be
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affected by device changes. Reliability also implied protection, from other users
changing data, and reading sensitive data. Seemingly at odds with the protection
goal, Multics had to allow controlled sharing of data and programs among consent
ing users. There are some of the factors that led to the design of Multics.
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult for a multiprogrammed system to allocate
memory if programs must be stored in contiguous physical locations. Physical con
tiguity makes sharing common code and data among many programs a formidable
task. Either multiple copies of shared programs must be made, which wastes valu
able space, and leads to problems of updating the copies, or an entire program or
data area must be made accessible to the sharing programs, which is dangerous.
This "all or nothing" form of protection was not acceptable any longer, given an in
creasingly sophisticated user population.
Multics solved these problems by using segmentation. A segment is a user-
named, user-defined portion of a program or data area. It has no fixed size, and
is the smallest sharable and protectable element. Segments in Multics are quite
different from the segments used in the earlier B5000. Multics segments are an
organizational and naming technique, rather than a memory allocation tool, as they
were on the B5000. Also segmentation is user controlled on Multics, not automati
cally controlled by the system.
Segments are used to implement files. Segments are associated with a pro
cess via the process's Known Segment Table (KST). When a process wants to
reference a common routine, it uses the routine's symbolic name. The name is
searched for in the KST; if it is found, the segment number stored in the KST is
used to determine the physical address. If the segment name is not found, then
the directory hierarchy of segments maintained by the system is searched. When
the segment is found, an entry is made in the KST of the requesting process. This
4-9
mapping procedure takes place at run-time, so there is no need to link program
pieces together before they are executed.
The KST entry for a segment points to the same physical location for all
processes using a shared segment. This eliminates the problems relating to updat
ing copies of shared files or programs, as each user is directly accessing the origi
nal entity.
Segmentation seems to solve the sharing problem. Hardware protection on
each segment also solves the access problem, since each segment can be read,
written, executed or totally isolated from other users. However, segmentation does
not solve the memory allocation problem. Granted, segments will often be much
smaller than entire programs and that would help the allocation difficulty some
what. But segments can dynamically change their size, and this could cause severe
problems. Since segment behavior is not predictable, preallocation of the maximum
segment size would waste valuable space, especially if restricted to contiguous
memory locations.
Multics solved the allocation problem by dividing the variable length segments
into fixed length pages. A page is 1024 words and a segment can contain up to
2 pages. Physical memory is divided into 1024 word page frames. A page can
reside in any available page frame. This allows the operating system maximum
flexibility regarding use of memory, while affording the user the convenience of
named segments. The paging aspects of the system are transparent to the user.
To see how these two techniques (segmentation and paging) fit together, one
must examine the translation of an instruction address into a physical address. An
address consists of a segment number and a word number within that segment.
Figure 1 shows the address translation process used to find the physical address
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from the segment number and word index. This addressing scheme makes sharing
procedures and data very simple. The information to be shared occupies a segment
that is made known to the requesting processes through the KSTs. The KST entry
points to the same segment for all the sharing procedures and the descriptor seg
ment table entries will be the same for each process. This way there is one copy
of the shared information available to processes with the proper access rights. The
supervisor is also a set of paged processes, and many of its routines are shared
among the user processes in this way.
We have seen how pages and segments are addressed, and how segmentation
facilitates sharing; the next step is to see how memory is actually allocated.
An area in memory is reserved for the Active Segment Table (AST), contain
ing information on segments whose page tables are in memory. Another portion of
memory, whose size is determined at initialization time, holds the page tables.
The page tables are all the same size. The supervisor divides the page tables into
two lists, a free list and a used list. When a segment not in core is needed, a
page table is chosen from the free list and the segment is added to the AST. If
there is no free page table, a segment and its page table are deactivated. The
segment chosen is the one which had no pages in core for the longest time. There
will always be at least one segment with no pages in core, since the number of ac
tive segments exceeds the number of pageable blocks of core. The segment tables
and AST will be updated accordingly. If the segment is a shared segment, all
corresponding segment descriptor tables will be updated.
When a page not in core is referenced, a page fault occurs. The core map is
cdnsulted to find a free page frame. This map groups page frames into a free list
and a used list. A page frame is selected from the free list, and the requested
page from storage is transferred into it. The page table and core map are then
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updated. A pool of free page frames is maintained by selecting pages to be writ
ten out to secondary storage. The selection process uses the in use bit in the page
table word to select the least recently used page for replacement.
In this scheme only referenced segments and pages are in memory. The least
recently used segments and pages are selected for replacement when there is not
enough memory. This minimizes the amount of paging traffic and thereby main
tains an acceptable level of performance.
Many virtual memory concepts were developed during or influenced by the
Multics project. It established a precedent for segmentation and paging, and the
mechanisms to implement them were the bases of future work. Computer vendors
were marketing virtual memory systems by 1966. IBM used the ideas of segmenta
tion and paging in the design of the S/360 Model 67 in 1966. Itwas made to com
pete in the timesharing market against the General Electric 645, the first machine
used in the Multics project. The 360/67 was the first model of the 360 series to
have hardware support for virtual memory, and a new operating system, TSS/360,
was developed for the system. A process could have 16 segments of up to 256
pages each. The page size was fixed at 4096 bytes. A high speed associative
memory sped up the address translation process.
These early systems showed many ways that virtual memory could be imple
mented. The next few years produced studies of the effects of virtual memory on
program performance, and methods to optimize overall system performance. Very
little was written in that period about specific implementations.
By 1968 various groups were modeling page replacement policies, program
behavior, and resource allocation strategies. Belady was the first to present a
comprehensive comparison of the myriad replacement algorithms [Bela68]. He
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grouped replacement algorithms into three major classes based on the type of
knowledge the system used to implement them.
Class 1 algorithms are those that do not retain any information on memory
usage and assume that all pages are equally likely to be referenced. A random re
placement algorithm, in which the page to be replaced is chosen totally randomly,
and a first-in first-out (FIFO) algorithm, in which the oldest page in memory is re
placed, are examples of Class 1 algorithms.
Class 2 algorithms are ones which classify pages by their history of most re
cent use. These generally keep lists of status bits indicating if a block had been
used or modified since the last check. Belady described a number of different
methods of chosing the replacement page; the most effective, named AR-1, is
based on a logical grouping of memory blocks based- on the "in
use" and "modified"
bits. The blocks are grouped as "not used-not modified", "not used-modified", "in
use-not modified", and "in use-modified", in that order. The algorithm indicates
that the page for replacement is chosen at random from the lowest ordered (start
ing from "not used-not modified") non-empty group. The "in use" bits are automat
ically reset when the last unused page is taken. This ensures that there will al
ways be a page not in use at replacement time.
Class 3 algorithms keep information on blocks in external storage as well as
those in main memory. An example of this class of algorithm is the replacement
scheme used on the Atlas, which always kept a free block in memory by chosing
one and copying it out onto drum before it's needed.
Belady concluded that the optimal replacement algorithm required knowledge
about future references, rather than previous references. He developed a model
that did optimal replacement for programs with known paging sequences, for use as
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a base of comparison for the other algorithms. He concluded that the random
selection, FIFO and AR-1 algorithms justified implementation. A good algorithm
strikes a balance between simplicity in randomness and complexity in information
accrual. A purely random scheme may not be the most efficient, but it does pro
vide a consistent level of performance and it is easy to implement. A more effi
cient algorithm may be very complex because of the information that it must
maintain to make the best choice, and that overhead may offset the benefit re
ceived.
Belady wasn't the only one studying virtual memory and paging strategies in
1968. That year Peter Denning published several papers describing the working set
model of program behavior, developed to help solve resource allocation problems
[Denn68]. The working set of a process is defined to be the minimum collections
of pages to be loaded into main memory in order for the process to operate effi
ciently. Denning estimated that it consisted of those pages that have been refer
enced in time At.
The working set principle states that a process may be run if and only if its
working set is in memory, and a page may not be removed if it is a member of
the working set of a running program. The working set principle was seen as a
way to implement the principle of optimality. It states that the page to be re
placed should be the one with the longest time until next reference, and if that is
not exactly known, the page whose expected time to reference is longest. The
working set principle maintains in memory a pool of pages that have been recently
referenced, and those are the pages most likely to be referenced in the near fu
ture, since programs follow the principle of locality. The principle of locality
states that references to a page tend to cluster and that programs tend to operate
within a few pages over a short period of time.
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The working set principle represents a resource allocation and paging policy.
That a program may run only if its working set will fit in memory ensures that the
program will be able to accomplish some useful work during its time slot. If there
is not enough memory for a program's working set, the working set of another pro
gram must be deactivated to make room for it. The pages deactivated will be
written out to disk as they are needed by the new process.
An objective of the working set theory was the prevention of the situation
known as thrashing. Thrashing is a collapse of performance caused by over com
mitting memory to too many programs. The system spends the greatest percentage
of its time moving pages in and out of memory and doing almost no useful work.
In a system not using a working set policy, one process can force the removal of
another process's critical pages. When the second process is given the processor, it
will soon reference the pages it lost, causing more paging I/O. If memory is still
full, it may remove pages from another process's working set, ad infinitum. If
there are enough processes in memory, it is possible to have all pages members of
some working set, and trashing will result. The practice of allowing a process to
page out any process's pages is called a global paging policy; a local paging policy
allows a process to page out only its own pages. With a local policy, it is not
possible for one program to degrade the performance of another.
Sharing is still possible using the working set policy, in that the shared pages
would be members of multiple working sets and the "in
use" bit would almost al
ways be on, so that a shared page would rarely be replaced.
The working set policy is predicated on the belief that balancing memory
demands is required to balance processor demands. Denning suggested that schedul
ing and memory management be closely related to achieve overall system balance.
This was very different from all that had come before: until this time processor
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utilization had been the overriding concern of most operating systems. That policy
may also be the reason that virtual memory had received a bad name, since thrash
ing was not an uncommon problem with many implementations. The working set
principle became widely accepted as a virtual memory control policy, and is used
by many systems today.
In 1970 Denning expanded upon his initial work on virtual memory [Denn70].
In addition to further investigation of the working set principle, studies were done
to determine optimum page size. The two factors that ,effect . the page size are
the amount of fragmentation of memory and the efficiency of the paging devices.
Fragmentation is the inability to assign physical locations to logical addresses be
cause the available memory is too small to be usable. Fragmentation can take two
forms: external and internal. In a non-paged system fragmentation is external:
many small blocks of unused memory are scattered about. If these small blocks are
combined into a single block, the memory may be usable. Paged systems suffer
from internal fragmentation. All pages in memory may be allocated, but there can
be a significant amount of space wasted within the pages.
The page size has a direct affect on the percentage of memory lost to inter
nal fragmentation: a small page size leads to less fragmentation. Denning found
that the optimum page size, from a fragmentation viewpoint, was
(2*c*s)*5
where c is the cost of fragmentation due to page tables vs. cost of fragmentation
within a page, and s is the segment size. Having many small pages requires larger
page tables, whereas large page sizes increases the number of words wasted within
a page. Assuming a c of 1, and that the segment size is less than 1000 words, the
optimum size is about 45 words or less.
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However, minimizing fragmentation is not the only consideration in choosing
page size. Pages have to be moved to and from secondary storage as part of the
paging process. Small page sizes do not make effective use of the disk, since the
seek time is significantly greater than the transfer time. The optimum page size
for a disk transfer was greater than 500 words, based on the disk technology of the
time. Most current virtual memory systems chose a page size that is a multiple of
the disk sector size, as this is the most efficient way to use the disk.
Denning also discussed paging policies with regard to the time when pages
were brought into memory. If a program's entire working set is brought into
memory at the time it is to run, this is a prepaging system. If the pages are not
brought into memory until they are referenced, it is known as a demand paging
system. He concluded that the demand paging scheme is more efficient, because
only those pages actually needed are brought in. He viewed prepaging as likely to
be futile, and the time to swap in the entire working set is not worth the over
head. However, prepaging could be beneficial if it is done when the I/O channels
are idle, and there is free memory available. The relative merits of prepaging and
demand paging are still open to debate.
Denning and his contemporaries established a solid base of virtual memory
management techniques. Research after this time concentrated on refinements of
the techniques, using analytical models of program and system behavior.
4.5. Contributions of the Era - 1961 to 1970
Virtual memory originated as a means to run large program in a small space,
without burdening the programmer. Hardware and software designs changed radical
ly to support this new structure. Hardware designs reacted to software demands
for faster addressing mechanisms that made virtual memory feasible. Software
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developers were then able to concentrate on optimizing their management tech
niques. Never before had there been as strong a dependency between hardware and
software designs.
4.5.1. Hardware Refinements
Virtual memory systems forced significant changes in computer architecture.
Programs no longer addressed a simple linear array of storage locations. Program
addresses were grouped into logical blocks, and words were referenced by a block
number and an index within the block. These blocks might be segments, in which
case an instruction address refers" to a segment number and word within that seg
ment. The logical groups might be pages, in which an address refers to a page and
a word within a page. In either case, the hardware must map the block number
and index into the specific word in the physical memory. If segmentation and pag
ing were used, the hardware must provide even more support to map logical ad
dresses to physical addresses. Software could have done the job, but it would be
prohibitively expensive from a performance standpoint.
Hardware assistance is also needed in selecting pages or segments to be re
placed. Over time the hardware aids have grown from a single "in use" bit, to a
series of indicators about access rights and page modification. Page replacement
requires transferring pages to and from disk or drum. The frequent need to replace
pages promoted different disk designs. Fixed head disks with a head per track
were developed to minimize the time to transfer a page from the disk.
Associative memories were developed during this period to speed up address
translation. An associative memory is addressed by a pattern. The pattern, for
example a segment number, is used to determine which cell in the associative
memory to access. All cells are checked in parallel, so searching is very fast.
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The associative memories are used to store some of the most recently used table
entries. The Atlas PARs were the first associative memories.
Another technique used to improve virtual memory performance is cache
memory. Cache memory is a small, high speed buffer for main memory. Memory
requests are given to both the cache and the main memory; if the information is in
the cache, it is returned to the processor immediately, and the main memory re
quest is canceled. With careful design, most requests are satisfied by the cache,
reducing the effective memory access time. The cache is updated with main
memory information whenever it can not satisfy the request. Many caches also
prefetch the next several words from main memory anticipating the next request.
Prefetching is based on the assumption that most instructions and data are accessed
sequentially.
For a period of time in the mid to late 1960's Extended Core Storage was a
popular concept. An ECS was a slower, cheaper, random access memory that could
be used instead of a paging disk or drum. At the time, ECS was faster than the
equivalent mechanical storage devices. When LSI memory technology became wide
ly available in the very early 1970s, ECS use declined, since the large fast
memories were now relatively inexpensive. Also faster, cheaper disks helped elim
inate ECS memories.
The development of larger memories did not eliminate the need for virtual
memory. While small memory sizes stimulated virtual memory development, virtual
memory provides too many other benefits, such as ease of sharing and more flexi
ble memory allocation, to be phased out by large memories. In fact, larger
memories helped virtual memory systems perform better, since more of the critical
tables could be made memory resident, and the system could afford to keep pools
of free pages available.
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4.5.2. Software Refinements
Virtual memory had a profound impact on memory allocation techniques. Pri
or to its development, a program was allocated a single sequential block of
memory; moving other programs if necessary. The granularity of allocation was an
entire program. With virtual memory systems, the units of allocation were either
segments or pages depending on the method used. A program was a collection of
these smaller units, making it easier to find blocks of memory when necessary.
Also, the entire program need not be resident to be run.
The addresses within a process on a virtual memory system are logical ad
dresses, which are mapped at run time to some physical memory cell. This address
independence makes resource allocation easier, in that any part of any program can
be placed where it is most convenient. Address independence also makes sharing
much easier since the shared code no longer must be part of the physical space of
a program. The entire system becomes more device and memory independent, be
cause there is no predefined relationship between logical and physical addresses.
The working set model established a method of determining how to allocate
memory to different programs in order for the system to run efficiently. The
working set policy ensures that the system is able to perform useful work, regard
less of the number of users demanding service. The working set principle also puts
restrictions on the page replacement scheme: when a process requests a new page,
the replacement page can not be a member of another process's working set. Re
placement pages must be selected from the process's own working set.
A host of algorithms to handle page replacement were developed. The one
most commonly seen today is the least recent used algorithm (LRU): it chooses for
replacement the page that has not been used for the longest time. This is based
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on the idea that programs exhibit a tendency to use the same small set of pages
over a short time interval. Therefore, the one used least recently is the least
likely to be referenced in the immediate future. This approximates the optimum
paging algorithm, which requires that the paging sequence be known in advance,
which is not attainable in practice. This is the algorithm used in Multics.
Other paging algorithms developed were the random replacement and first-in
first-out schemes described by Belady. Others were biased first-in first-out, in
which the page chosen was from the process's own pages and selected from those
via FIFO. The least frequently used (LFU) choses that page which has been used
the least over some defined period of time for replacement. Other schemes in
volved user or system defined priority; the page to be replaced was selected from
the lowest priority process. Within that process the page was chosen using one of
the other algorithms. The choice of paging algorithm depends on the hardware sup
port available and the complexity desired in the software.
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5. Security and Protection Systems
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the development of security policies and protection
mechanisms as they relate to operating systems. Many aspects of security and pro
tection will not be covered; this chapter focuses on those developments that have
had significant effect on the design of operating systems. Security and protection
are still active research topics, so the chapter is necessarily incomplete.
Concern about the protection of system and user programs and data has been
evident since operating systems were first developed. The earliest systems worried
about protecting the system supervisor from modification by faulty user programs.
When multiprogramming (especially interactive multiprogramming) became available,
the protection problems became more acute. At the same time, increasing demand
for sharing data and programs complicated the protection problem. As research
progressed, security features were incorporated into operating
systems'design at
their inception. Eventually security was deemed to be a fundamental function of
operating systems. The design was modified so that the heart of the system was
the security kernel, with all other functions built on top of this kernel.
5.2. Definition of Terms
Basic terms used in the chapter are defined here; other terms are explained
as they appear in the body of the text.
Access refers to the authorization to use information stored in the computer;
it also refers to attempts to use that information.
Principal refers to that entity in a computer system to which authorizations
are granted.
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Privacy is the right of an individual to decide what personal information may
be released, to whom it may be released and when it may be released. Privacy is
sues are beyond the scope of this chapter.
A process is a collection of program procedures and data operating together
to perform some task.
Security refers to the policies and mechanisms that control who may use the
information stored in the computer, and the ways they may use it. A policy is a
guiding principle governing who may obtain or modify information. A protection
mechanism is a device designed to enforce the security policy.
5.3. Early Influences and Motivations
Protection mechanisms have been the concern of hardware and software sys
tem designers since automatic control systems were developed in the mid 1950s.
The most primitive resident supervisors provided standard I/O routines to users. As
soon as this service was made available it became apparent that an erroneous user
program could modify the supervisor, causing it to act erratically or not at all.
The problem became more acute when the supervisor functions grew to include job
sequencing and job set-up. If a user compromised the supervisor's code or data,
man and machine time were lost in restoring the supervisor and rerunning the af
fected jobs.
The protection problems grew significantly with the change to multiple user
systems. Not only did the system have to be protected from the users, but the
users had to be protected from each other. Security policies had to be extended
to secondary storage devices, as disks became more common and users started
maintaining data files on-line. To complicate issues, users wanted to share data
and code, so total isolation of users was not an acceptable security policy. These
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were the motivating factors behind research into operating system protection
mechanisms.
5.4. Historical Development
5.4.1. Early Concepts
In the late 1950's software supervisors provided job sequencing and set up
functions, as well as libraries of commonly used subroutines and I/O functions. The
systems were capable of overlapping the output of one job with the execution of a
second job and the input of a third job. It became unacceptable to allow one
user's undebugged program to compromise the operation of the supervisor or other
user programs.
In response to these increasing pressures for protection mechanisms, hardware
designs began to include special aids. Bounds or limit registers were used in the
late 1950s to define a program's upper and lower physical memory limits [Stra59].
On every memory access, the hardware checked the address against the limits, and
reported illegal access attempts to the software supervisor.
This approach solved the immediate problem adequately. However, the com
puter industry was growing very rapidly, and the drive was towards multiprogram
ming systems. With these systems came new protection problems, and more sophis
ticated techniques were needed to solve them.
5.4.2. Early Systems
The Manchester University Atlas, announced in 1961, was a pioneer in many
areas of computer design [Kilb'61]. It was among the earliest multiprogramming
systems, it was the first virtual memory system, and we shall see that it developed
a novel solution to the protection problems of the times.
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The operating system was protected in several ways. The most critical rou
tines were implemented in read only memory, where they were safe from meddle
some user programs. The computer's main memory was divided into fixed length
pages, as were user programs. The supervisor maintained a directory which defined
which pages belonged to which users. Users were only allowed to access pages
which belonged to them. This policy was enforced with help from the hardware.
Each main memory page had a register associated with it, and one of the pieces of
information kept in it was a lockout indicator. The supervisor set the indicator on
or off depending on whether the page was in the current user's list of owned pages
or not. The cpu blocked any access to pages that had the lockout indicator on.
When another user was scheduled to run, the supervisor altered the lockout indica
tors to reflect which pages belonged to the new process and locked out all other
pages. The portions of the operating system that were run in main memory were
protected from the user programs in the same manner.
The system had rudimentary protection for secondary storage as well. The
main input and output facilities were magnetic tapes; the tape units could be con
figured as required to perform specific operating system services. To prevent prob
lems associated with mounting the wrong tape on the wrong drive, and destroying
potentially valuable system information, the system performed tape label checking.
This appears to be the only special protection function for auxiliary storage.
The Compatible Time Sharing System, CTSS, appeared in preliminary form in
1962, and was in development for several more years [Corb62, Corb65]. This sys
tem represented the first major attempt at an interactive multiprogramming sys
tem. A method of identifying authorized on-line users had to be developed. Users
were required to "logon" and identify themselves. Each user had his own private
file tape on which he kept his data and programs; logging on made the tape
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available to the user. Memory protection was provided via limit registers.
Other improvements were made during the early 1960s. Many machines had
two operating modes, one for the supervisory software and one for users. When
operating in user mode, all memory references were checked against the limit re
gisters; in supervisor mode, the checks were ignored and certain privileged instruc
tions, such as the I/O instruction or limit register instructions, could be executed.
This scheme protected the limit registers from modification by users, thereby main
taining system integrity.
The concepts presented were soon adopted by other systems under develop
ment at the time. The field was dormant for several years before the next major
breakthrough.
5.4.3. The Growth Years - 1965 to Present
Multics (1965) was the successor of CTSS, and represents a major milestone in
operating system's design [Grah68, Orga72, Salt74]. It has been discussed in detail
in the previous chapter, so only the protection related portions will be described
here.
The protection mechanisms implemented in Multics are governed by a prede
fined security policy. There are five basic principles employed. First, protection
is to be based on a default authorization of no access; permission has to be ex
pressly given for access to allowed, rather than excluding permission on a selective
basis. Second, every access to every object has to be checked against the current
authorizations, since access privileges are allowed to change. Third, the protection
system must not depend on the ignorance of the attackers for its effectiveness.
Fourth, the principle of least privilege should be followed, which states that a pro
cess should be granted only those privileges necessary and sufficient to perform the
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task assigned it; if the nature of the task changes, the privileges should change ac
cordingly. Last, the human interface must be easy to use to encourage users to
use the protection systems, rather than circumvent them.
One of the protection mechanisms relates to the addressing scheme.
Processes are made up of named segments of arbitrary size. A segment represents
any collection of information, such as data or subprograms, important enough to
have a name; the segment is the smallest unit of protection on the system. Asso
ciated with each process is a table of segment descriptors, giving the segment size
and the applicable types of access. If an illegal access is attempted, or a refer
ence is made outside the bounds of the segment, a hardware trap occurs.
Segments can be shared among processes: each authorized process has an en
try in its descriptor table pointing to the same segment. The creator of the seg
ment is the owner, and determines the type of access permitted to other users.
Each segment has associated with it an access control list (ACL), which specifies
which users have what permission to the segment. The types of accesses allowed
are combinations of read, write, execute, and append. When a process accesses a
segment for the first time, the ACL for the segment is consulted to obtain the ac
cess rights for the segment descriptor. Through the ACL it is possible to com
pletely isolate a segment from all other users, or to share it in any way desired.
Since groups of users may be working on a common project, or a user may
develop a utility program to be made available to all users on the system, a more
convenient way of forming the access control list was needed, to conform to the
last protection principle mention above. To this end, users and processes are iden
tified by a three part principal identifier. The components are the user name, a
project identifier, and a compartment within the project. If a user wants only
"Jones" to access his segments, he would specify in the ACL "Jones.*.*", giving
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Jones access to the segment from any group or compartment. If the user wants
all members of the Payroll group to access the segment, he would specify "?.Pay
roll.*". The type of accesses (read, write, execute, append) to be allowed would be
listed. In this way a user can protect his files from other users, or even himself.
A user's segments are entered in a directory. An ACL is defined for each
directory, either by the user or the system, to serve as a default for every seg
ment entered in the directory. The user is free to change the default if desired,
and to change the particular access list for any segments in the directory.
Multics was a long lived development project, and over time other protection
features were added. One mechanism that began in software and was eventually
implemented in hardware is the ring structure. [Grah68, Orga72]. The rings are
numbered from 0, with 0 being the most privileged ring. The original design called
for up to 32 system rings and up to 32 user rings.
The purpose of the rings is to provide intraprocess protection. Each segment
has one ring associated with it; a process executing that segment thereby has that
ring number associated with it. Any attempt to access a segment in a different
ring, generates a ring crossing fault. On a ring crossing, a process is allowed to
access segments with a larger (less privileged) ring number than its current ring
number. An access to a lower numbered (more privileged) ring causes a trap to
the operating system.
The concept was implemented differently to minimize the system overhead.
Instead of having a single ring associated with a segment, it has a list of adjacent
rings that it can access and from which it can be accessed, called the access
bracket. This was done so that common service routines could be accessed by the
supervisor and users without causing a ring crossing fault on most references. If a
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service routine was implemented in a single ring, only segments in that ring could
access it without generating a fault.
There is also a call bracket , which represents a band of rings outside the ac
cess bracket that the segment is permitted to call. With each segment is a list of
valid ring entry points called a gate list. When a call is made to a segment in a
lower ring number, a fault occurs. A process called the gatekeeper checks if the
call is to an entry point in the gate list. If it is, the call is allowed, otherwise it
fails. Only calls can transfer control to a more privileged segment. A segment can
not obtain more privileges than it was originally granted, but it can have a more
privileged segment do work on its behalf. An example of the operation of the
Multics ring structure is given in Figure 5-1.
The gatekeeper also pushes the return address and the ring number of the cal
ling segment on the stack, and if an attempt is made to return to the segment
through a different path, a fault is generated. Thus entry into and exit from the
interior rings is carefully monitored. In addition to these checks, any arguments
passed to inner ring segments are checked to be sure that the calling segment has
access privileges to the argument segments. This keeps users from tricking the
operating system into disclosing information that the user does not have rights to.
The protection mechanisms in Multics are sophisticated, and some of them
have been incorporated into other operating systems, including current commercial
operating systems such as DEC'S Vax/VMS and Bell Labs Unix.
In 1966, not long after Multics was announced, Dennis and Van Horn published
a paper called "Programming Semantics for Multiprogrammed Computations"
[Denn66]. In it they described a number of protection concepts, one of which was
the idea of capability lists (C-lists). Each capability in the list located some
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A target procedure, possibly a system utility, has an access bracket consisting
of 32 and 33, and a call bracket of rings 34 and 35. If the target procedure
is called from either of the rings in the access bracket (32 or 33) the access is al
lowed, without a ring crossing fault. If the target procedure is called from a pro
cedure executing within the call bracket (34 or 35), a ring crossing fault occurs,
and the access is allowed only if the calling procedure is entering through a valid
entry point. If the target procedure is called from a procedure executing within a
lower numbered (higher privileged) ring, access is permitted, but a ring crossing
fault occurs. If a procedure executing withing rings 36 through 63 calls the target-
procedure the entry is blocked since the call is from a less privileged ring that is
not within the call bracket.
Figure 5-1
Multics Ring Structure and Operation
object in the system and indicated the actions that could be performed on the ob
ject. An object was any part of the system that required specific protection. An
object was only accessible through a capability. A set of processes having a com
mon C-list was considered a computation, and operated within a sphere of protec
tion defined by the C-list. The segment descriptor list in the Multics system is an
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example of a C-list, in which the only type of object is a segment.
The idea of a set of processes forming a logical computation unit had in
teresting ramifications. Dennis proposed a number of primitives designed to control
parallel programming, in which a process may spawn other processes, each proceed
ing in parallel and perhaps joining later. Creating a new process involved granting
capabilities. The parent process could selectively grant capabilities from its own
capability list, creating a less powerful offspring if desired. The parent process
had access to the state of the child process for exception handling. This could be
very useful in debugging, where the debugger could place a protective sphere
around the program being tested. An even more promising application would be to
make the operating system the parent process and have it selectively grant capabil
ities to user processes.
It took several years for the ideas . presented to be fully explored. The arti
cles for the next several years concentrated on privacy issues, physical security
measures and data encryption techniques, rather than secure operating system
designs. The only articles relating to operating systems were methods of user iden
tification and techniques for protecting user passwords.
In 1969 Butler Lampson expanded upon the ideas of Dennis and Van Horn
[Lamp69, Lamp74]. The problem he tackled was the issue of protecting the pro
tection mechanisms. Unless the mechanisms, such as the capability lists, were
themselves protected from user modification, the security of the system could be
compromised.
He defined a capability to be the protected name of an object. A domain was
defined to be a group of capabilities, and a process executed within some domain,
and could exercise the capabilities that belonged to Vhat domain. When an object
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is created, a capability is created by the system to name it. Capabilities belong
to the system, and can only be manipulated, not created or destroyed, by the users.
Capabilities should be hidden inside the supervisor to prevent users from changing
them. Lampson proposed a tagged hardware architecture to help protect the capa
bilities. Each word has a tag field, indicating if users or only the supervisor can
modify the word; capabilities would be marked as supervisor only, and the hardware
would be responsible for the integrity of the capabilities.
Several methods were proposed to describe the relationship between domains,
objects and capabilities. One possibility was to list all the domains as rows and all
the objects as columns in a matrix A. The element A[I,J] specified the access
rights that domain I had to object J. However since there could be many objects
and domains, and most elements in the matrix would be empty, it was not practical
to store the information in matrix form. Capability lists consisting of object name,
access attribute pairs were used to describe the access matrix in a more compact
form.
A computation consisted of several processes, each running in their own
domain. Since each process ran in its own domain, small programs could be col
lected together to form larger programs without extensive advance planning about a
common environment. Each piece did its function with only that collection of
capabilities required for the job. If data needed to be passed between processes,
capabilities for the data objects could be passed.
If control was to be passed from one domain to another, care had to be taken
that security was not compromised. Lampson proposed an idea of protected entry
points for domains, similar to the gates in Multics. A gate was a capability for a
particular domain. Gates could be passed as capabilities, giving the calling program
access to the routine entered by the gate. Like
Multics'
gate system, the domain
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and return location were saved on a stack and the return must be through the
same gate.
There was also a need to relate capabilities, which the system used to name
objects, to symbolic names for the users. Another object type called a directory,
contained information for mapping the external user names into capabilities.
The problem with a system based on capabilities is that the implementation
and the logical design are complex. If an object, such as a file, is to be shared, a
capability for that object must be passed from the object's owner to all those that
want to use it. A method of making the procedure easy for the user, while
maintaining the integrity of the capabilities was proposed by Lampson. An access
key is an object that identifies other objects as belonging to a particular user. For
example, if a user's name is Jones, his access key would be Jones*, where Jones*
is a system provided, uniquely encoded id. To give Jones access to another user's
files, "Jones" would be added to the access list associated with the file. When
Jones'
computation accessed that file, the computation would have the capability
Jones* which defines the object Jones, which would be in the access list of the
file. To grant access to another user, only the user's name need be known, not
the user's capabilities or unique id. The idea of access keys can be expanded to
groups of the type described in the discussion of Multics.
There are other problems with capability based protection systems. Some
mechanism has to be provided to allow an owner of an object to revoke the capa
bility to that object from selected users. Once a capability has been granted there
is no easy way to determine which users have that capability. Several methods
have been suggested that could solve this problem. One is that a segment would
be associated with each user, holding all the capabilities for a user. Only these
segments, which would be known to the system,
need to be examined to revoke a
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capability or to take inventory of the users having a capability. Another method
proposed uses indirect objects as a means of granting and revoking capabilities.
Capabilities would be given only for an indirect object that points to the real ob
ject. There would be an indirect object for each principal given access to the real
object. To cancel the privilege, the indirect object would be deleted, only affect
ing the one user associated with it [Need72].
The basic problem of a system having only capability based protection
mechanisms is that the privileges to objects are bound to users when the capability
is copied, and there is no information retained to reverse the binding. A capability
is like the key to an unguarded locked door: having a copy of the key is sufficient
to open the door. Once the key has been given out, there is no easy way to re
cover it. Even if the key was returned, there would still be some question of how
much protection the lock now gave. What is needed is a way to guard the door.
For this reason many systems make use of a combination of capabilities (keys)
and access control lists (guards). The capabilities are for use by the system, and
the access control lists provide a way for the user to keep track of his own ob
jects and the authorizations given to other users.
In 1970 a totally different approach to protection was taken, as a byproduct
of an attempt to provide a more flexible multiprogramming system [McCu70].
CP-67/CMS, from IBM, was a product that allowed multiple operating systems to
run simultaneously on one machine. Each user could run under his own operating
system, which had the effect of totally isolating the user from any other users.
Several users could run under one operating system copy and share programs and
data subject to the limitations of that operating system. They would still be
separated from any other users on the system. The problem with this approach
was that the multiple levels of control software resulted in poor performance.
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However the idea of providing users with their own virtual machine had potential
as a protection mechanism.
The concepts presented to this point were topics of discussion until about
1974. By that time government pressure for secure computing had been building
and culminated in the Privacy Act of 1974. Also the Multics project, which was
the dominating system of the late 1960s had peaked out by the first third of the
1970s. Researchers were branching out into new territory. The new research trend
was towards designing a very small, security oriented operating system nucleus that
could be verified by formal techniques.
The early basis for this new design philosophy was work done by Per Brinch
Hansen in 1970 [Hans70]. He had developed a system nucleus, which provided only
primitive functions, on which different operating systems could be built to satisfy
various needs. The nucleus governed dynamic creation and control of processes, in
put and output, and interprocess communication. Interprocess communication was
through messages, sent through the nucleus, within which the senders and receivers
of messages were identified for protection. The nucleus provided these services as
a logical extension of the hardware, and operating systems were to be implemented
on top of it. The operating system would provide scheduling, file services,
language processors and other utility functions.
The security kernel concept developed in 1974 was similar to Hansen's nu
cleus, in that it represents the lowest layer in a hierarchy of system service layers.
The difference is that the security kernel consists of only security functions and
encompassing all security functions. The rest of operating
system is built using the
kernel primitives as a base.
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The advantages of this approach are that the security related code is all in
one place and thereby less subject to penetration. This is especially true if the
primitives are implemented as uninterruptible actions, so there is no data integrity
problem during the time between authentication and authorization. If an interrup
tion is allowed between the check for rights to privileges and the granting of
privileges, it is possible for the system to check one process and then grant that
process's privilege to a different process. A user could gain system privileges by
switching places with a system task after the authentication step.
Also, since the kernel is the lowest level, it does not rely on the correct
operation of any other portion of the system for its own proper operation. There
fore if the security kernel is correct, the outer layers of the operating system can
not degrade the security of the system. Since the kernel is compact, it can be
subjected to formal verification techniques to prove its correctness.
Several systems used the kernel approach to implement operating systems.
One system implemented in 1974 using a security kernel was the UCLA-VM system
by Popek and Kline [Pope74]. The security policy was based on the concept of
objects and capabilities. The kernel provided mechanisms to manipulate objects,
but had no concept of the internal structure of the objects. The kernel included
the interrupt handlers, which provided basic control over the hardware. The kernel
was kept very small, as the maximum size program verifiable at that time was
about 2000 instructions. To verify the kernel two things were required: the explicit
definitions of security had to be translated into predicates for mathematical in
terpretation, and properties of the primitives had to be verified. This second phase
included tests that there be no order of invoking the primitives that would cause a
security breach.
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The system implemented on top of the security kernel was a virtual machine.
A virtual machine was the major object of the system. Since the kernel couldn't
provide intra object protection, there was no protection within a virtual machine.
However, there was protection between virtual machines, since each was a protect
able object. Each user ran his own copy of the operating system on his own virtu
al machine, which provided total isolation from other users. This approach was
taken because of its ease of implementation. This allowed the researchers to con
centrate of the kernel portion of the project rather than on the higher level
operating system services.
A different approach to the security problem was taken by MITRE Corp in
1974 [Lipn74]. Their system was based on the premise that
current operating system software is incapable of preventing access by any
program to any information accessible to the processor, thus information
that is to be made inaccessible to a user must be isolated from the pro
cessor.
To this end, they used a minicomputer front end to act as a reference monitor.
The monitor controlled all communications to and from the central processor, and
checked accesses to all objects in the system. The monitor was implemented in a
front end processor to conform to the three following premises. First, every ac
cess to every object was to be checked by the monitor. Second, the monitor and
its data base were to be protected from the users and third, the monitor had to be
small enough to be verified. Putting the reference monitor in hardware between
the user and the main processor ensured that these constraints were met. This
represented an interesting approach, providing the security needed with the technol
ogy available, but it was not adopted elsewhere.
In 1978 and 1979 more security kernels were developed. Popek and Kline
were working on a new project, developing a security kernel for Unix [Pope78,
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Pope79]. As part of the project they investigated general issues in kernel design.
Basic factors affecting kernel design were determined to be the security policy, the
variety of primitive functions, and the hardware characteristics.
The security policy determines broad aspects of security, such as the granular
ity of the objects, operations on the objects, whether the sharing is supported and
whether data security is the only concern or if denial of service is considered as
well. The granularity of objects refers to the precision with which objects can be
defined. For example, is a file the lowest level object or can records or data
fields within the file be defined as individually protectable objects? Given the ob
jects of the system, what type of operations are to be provided for their manipula
tion? Can users define their own object type and have the system provide
protection for them? What types of devices will be supported? (The more unique
device types supported, the more complex the kernel becomes.) Are the primitives
sufficient to easily build an operating system using them? Are all the primitives
necessary? (The larger the kernel the harder it will be to prove it correct.) These
are all policy questions relevant to kernel design.
The hardware can have an effect on the design: especially in the area of I/O
primitives, certain hardware characteristics can make implementation more difficult.
If the hardware provides support for capabilities, such as a tagged architecture or
capability registers, the kernel can be made much smaller.
Popek and Kline proposed a layered approach to kernel design as a means of
reducing the size of the most critical areas of the kernel. They distributed func
tions among trusted and distrusted processes. Trusted
processes are not part of the
kernel, because their function is peripheral to the main task, but their correct
operation is essential to the security of the system. Trusted processes depend, for
their correct operation, only on the correctness of their own implementation and
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that of lower levels in the kernel. They can not be compromised by distrusted
processes, because they do not rely on correct operation of the distrusted
processes. An example of an operation that could be moved into trusted code is
the user authentication process that is activated at logon.
Examples of operations that can be moved out of the kernel and into distrust
ed processes are memory management and process scheduling. In the case of the
scheduler, distrusted processes would determine what job to run next, and then call
the kernel to perform sensitive functions, such as context switching. The distrusted
processes would be able to move the objects it managed, but can not examine or
change their contents. That way the security of the objects is intact, while
minimizing the direct responsibilities of the security kernel.
The Unix security kernel was implemented as a multi layered system. The
kernel itself implemented abstract object types and operations on those types, and
it was the only portion of the system that could issue I/O instructions. Outside
the kernel were some trusted processes upon which the system security depends.
The policy manager was capable of providing extensions to the kernel defined ob
ject types, such as file system object types. (The kernel itself only supported four
types: processes, pages, devices and capabilities.) The other trusted process was the
dialoguer which owned all terminals and was responsible for user authentication.
The dialoguer indicated to the policy manager what user was to be associated with
each terminal process. Between the kernel and the user process was a Unix inter
face that provided an environment for the process, and handled communications
between the user and the other portions of the system.
Other groups were working on a security kernel for Unix at the same time
[McCa79]. One was KSOS, Kernel Secure Operating System, from Ford Aerospace.
The system consisted of a security kernel, a Unix Emulator and non-security system
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software. Like the UCLA kernel, the KSOS kernel supported only a limited number
of object types; these were processes, process segments, files, devices and file sub
types. The only object type that was Unix specific was a file subtype for Unix
style directories. The system was designed to be very general, so that other
operating systems would be built to run on it via different emulators. The Unix
emulator provided user functions, and gave Unix specific properties to the kernel
defined objects to provide a Unix compatible user interface.
An interesting protection mechanism was used <^n this system to prevent users
from masquerading as the logon process and stealing passwords. The terminal was
treated as two separate devices, one secure and one insecure device. The secure
device was only accessible through privileged software. When a special attention
character was typed, the device was switched to the secure device. This attention
character was used as part of the login process.
Another system developed in 1979 was PSOS, Provably Secure Operating Sys
tem, by SRI [Feie79]. This system was also based on capabilities, but the protec
tion for them and operations on them were intended to be in the hardware. The
system was not kernel based; it was a collection of hierarchical modules, each de
fining new abstractions composed from lower level abstractions. Capabilities were
the lowest level abstraction, and were used to uniquely name the abstract objects
created at higher level. Processes, pages, and segments are examples of higher
level abstractions in the system. Protection policies were implemented using sub
systems of abstract objects. Each subsystem would have to be proved correct, for
the entire system to be verifiably secure. The system has not been implemented
on any currently available commercial hardware.
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5.4.4. Current Activity
The concept of verifiable security kernels is still under investigation. The
concept has not yet caught on in commercial products. However the research is
bound to continue, motivated by the need for secure systems, secure networks and
government pressure for privacy controls.
5.5. Contributions of the Era
Since this topic is still an area of active research, the list of contributions
can be expected to grow over time.
5.5.1. Hardware Refinements
It is difficult to distinguish hardware changes influenced by protection from
those motivated by multiprogramming, since the two were so closely related in
their early phases. Hardware limit registers, privileged instructions, and dual
operating modes were all a result of pressures from these two areas.
The original concepts of segmentation were developed to help make multipro
gramming easier to implement, but it had added benefits related to protection.
Access control information was added to the segment descriptors, and the hardware
became responsible for access checking. These checks were more involved than the
simple memory limit checks on earlier machines. These checks validated not only
memory limits but also the type of access being made.
In the early 1960s and for many years afterwards there was a supervisor and
user mode on many machines. As protection systems became more complex, it was
useful to have multiple levels, such as kernel, supervisor and user modes. Attempts
by processes to execute instructions or processes in more privileged modes generate
traps, so that the operating system can intervene and determine what action is
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appropriate. Having multiple modes makes it easier to implement rings of protec
tion, with hardware traps helping to enforce gatekeeping between rings.
When capability based protection mechanisms came into use, special hardware
was desired to speed up access checking. Some machines, including the Honeywell
6180 on which later version of Multics were implemented, were equipped with a
number of capability registers, that kept information on what access rights the run
ning process had. These registers were maintained as part of the operating en
vironment of a process.
Tagged architectures, where words in the system have a field indicating under
what operating modes the word can be accessed, were also influenced in part by
capability based protection systems. With increasing concern over security and the
number of modern systems that use capabilities for protection, this type of
architecture may become more common.
5.5.2. Software Refinements
There have been many software techniques developed as a result of research
into protection mechanisms. Logon procedures used on most modern interactive
system were developed during this period. There are numerous encryption tech
niques and methods to prevent passwords from being stolen. Directory structures
were developed as a means of organizing the growing amount of online user data,
and to provide a way to protect that data. The directory encapsulated the user
files and provided a gateway to the data. Within the directory a user could selec
tively control access to his files.
Two basic protection architectures were developed: ticket and list controlled.
If one develops a general model of protection in which there is an impenetrable
wall around each object needing protection, with a guard posted at the gate in the
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wall, then ticket and list controlled systems define the action of the guard.
In a ticket controlled system, each user having access to an object is given
an unforgeable ticket to that object. When an access is attempted, the user
presents the ticket to the guard. The guard matches the ticket against the identif
ier it knows about, and if there is a match, the access is allowed. The guard
knows nothing about the users, just that anyone with a ticket can be allowed to
access the object. Capabilities are a form of ticket; passwords are another form
of ticket. The key concern in a ticket based system is that the tickets must be
unforgeable and that they cannot be copied and passed indiscriminately. Copy bits
in the tickets can be used to indicate whether the ticket can be propagated.
In a list controlled system, the guard has a list of all users who can access
the object. The Multics access control list is an example of this type of mechan
ism. The problem with this type of system is that access checks involve searchs
through the list, which can be time consuming, if done on every access. Users are
often grouped so that the lists are more easily controlled by the owner of the ob
ject. The lists make it easy to keep track of what users have access to each ob
ject. Many systems use a combination of ticket and list controls to combine the
performance advantages of a ticket system with the user interface of a list con
trolled system.
Virtual machines were developed as a means of allowing one machine to run
many operating systems. The original motivation was to provide flexibility, by al
lowing users to run earlier operating systems on new machines. The concept pro
vides a secure environment for users of the virtual machines. There may be secu
rity problems within the operating systems on the
virtual machines, but if each
user is using his own copy of the operating system,
the technique is secure. Un
fortunately there is a heavy performance penalty associated with the multiple
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layers of complex system software.
The organization of protection mechanisms within the operating system has
changed over time. Protection mechanisms until fairly recently have been "ad
hoc". They were not an integral part of the design, or if they were, their imple
mentation was such that holes in the protection system were inevitable. Making a
system secure consisted of patching known leaks and running tests to try to break
the security. This approach has been replaced, in the research community, by the
security kernel concept. In that approach the security policies are thoroughly de
fined and verified by formal techniques. The kernel consists of all and only those
aspects of the system relating to security. Once the kernel has been proved
secure, the rest of the operating system can be built on the security base without
fear of breaking security.
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6. Distributed Processing Systems
6.1. Introduction
This chapter traces the development of operating systems for distributed com
puter networks. The primary focus will be on software for networks of autonomous
computers rather than for multiprocessing systems. Multiprocessing systems will be
briefly discussed in their role as the base of modern computer networks.
The desire for multiple cooperating processors arose early in the development
of computers. Multiprocessor systems first appeared with the Univac LARC in
1956, and have been available in many forms ever since. A different trend in the
design of cooperating computers developed in the early 1970s. Functionally com
plete computers were linked by communications lines to share storage and computa
tional resources. The computers in these networks were often from different ven
dors, each running its own operating system.
Early network software handled physical communication and primitive data
transfer; users worked directly with each host operating system. More recent net
work software has attempted to make the network operations transparent to the
user by providing a standard interface to the network resources. Methods for pro
viding this user environment are still an area of intense research.
6.2. Definition of Terms
In the area of distributed computing there are many terms used. To establish
a common base for the coming discussion, some terms are defined here.
Coupling refers to the logical and physical relationships between processors in
a network. A closely coupled system is one in which the individual processors work
as a unit. A loosely coupled system is one in which the processors are independent
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units that can function by themselves, or can cooperate with the others to perform
some function.
A distributed computer network is composed of multiple, fully functional com
puters. In this chapter, this will usually mean the opposite of a multiprocessor sys
tem.
A guest operating system provides a standard command interface to the users
by acting as a mediator between the user and existing operating systems of host
computers.
A multiprocessor is a computer system composed of multiple processing units
sharing a common memory and controlled by a single operating system. Typically,
the processors do not have enough resources to function as standalone computer
systems.
A node refers to one or more computers connected, as a unit, to a network.
6.3. Early Influences and Motivations
The roots of computer networks extend back to the middle 1950s. At that
time computers were expensive and slow. They were being used for large scientific
and mathematical problems; a computation could take hundreds of hours to com
plete. This caused two problems: first, the machine was not available to other
users for the duration of the computation, and second, the machines were unreliable
and rarely remained operational for several
hundred consecutive hours. Increased
speed and reliability were needed to improve
throughput. The technology had not
advanced enough to increase the speed through faster circuitry, and component reli
ability was still unsatisfactory. As a
result multiprocessor systems were developed,
starting in the late 1950s, that increased the
speed through parallel operation of
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the processors, while the redundancy aided reliability.
These concepts represent the early motivations for distributed processing. The
motivations and techniques changed as computers became more common and sophis
ticated.
The development of distributed systems was limited to multiprocessing systems
until about 1970. By that time many changes had occurred in the hardware and
software technology that affected the progress of distributed processing. Hardware
costs had decreased dramatically since the 1950s. As a result, many corporations
had more than one computer. Also, computers had diversified over the years:
manufacturers had different product lines for commercial processing and scientific
computing. In response, corporations started to decentralize computing by providing
different groups with machines suited to their specific needs. Minicomputers had
been available for many years, and were starting to be more common. These sys
tems had small memories and limited secondary storage, but were inexpensive and
easy to justify for single projects. The computing environment changed from one
large computer in a central location to many smaller computers in diverse loca
tions, each with different capabilities and resources. This was to be a key factor
in the development of distributed computer networks.
6.4. Early Concepts
Many software changes had taken place since the multiprocessors of the late
1950s. Interactive and batch multiprogramming systems were common. Users were
accustomed to sharing the system hardware with others, and often used the facili
ties to share code and data as well.
Other significant changes had taken place in the design of programs. Pro
grams had been viewed previously as sequential groups of instructions, to be
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executed serially. Dijkstra had proposed in 1968 that programs be viewed as col
lections of cooperating sequential processes. Processes could run in parallel, each
at its own speed, synchronizing as necessary with the other processes in the compu
tation. This had several ramifications. If a computation consisted of many parallel
processes, these processes could run on different processors. All that was required
was a way to pass synchronization information between the processors running the
cooperating processes.
It was also recognized that an operating system could be constructed as a
collection of cooperating processes. Rather than being a single monolithic program,
an operating system could provide a nucleus of primitive functions, with a collec
tion of service processes built on the nucleus. This decentralized approach made it
possible to implement the functionally distributed operating systems used in comput
er networks.
The philosophy of an operating system nucleus, with cooperating processes pro
viding higher level system functions, coupled with the resource sharing philosophy of
timesharing systems led to the development of computer networks.
6.5. Historical Development
6.5.1. Early Systems
In 1970 the ARPA computer network (ARPANET) was announced. This was an
experimental system developed with the support of the Defense Department's Ad
vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The goal of ARPANET was to provide a
base for research into network hardware, software and communications technology
[Robe70]. ARPA recognized that a wealth of software existed throughout the
computer community, but transporting that software to different sites and different
machines was costly. Timesharing systems like the GE Mark II service
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demonstrated that resources could be shared by many diverse users on one machine.
The next step was to extend the timesharing concept across machine borders,
thereby eliminating the need to transport software.
The network consisted of existing independent computer systems at various
sites throughout the nation. There were about 20 sites in the original network;
these were chosen to represent different application areas and machine types. An
objective of the ARPANET was to make all network resources available to every
node, in such a way that programs could be used remotely. Any program should be
able to request the resources of a remote computer much as it would call a sub
routine.
There were some difficulties for the users, because sites were running dif
ferent machines with different operating systems. To access remote resources, the
user had to be aware of where those resources were located; there was no au
tomatic routing of requests along the network. The easiest way to use a remote
system was to logon to it. To do this, the user logged on to the local system, and
used the network to access the remote system. Commands to the remote system
were be routed by the local system through the network.
There were many problems associated with this method of remote access.
First, it was burdensome: a user had to be familiar with the operating system of
each different host, and he had to have a separate account on each machine he
used. Each of these accounts could have data files and programs, but there was no
coordination of the accounts. The user was responsible for remembering where all
his files resided, which was difficult if he had
accounts on many machines.
Some interesting software issues arose from the remote logon concept. The
user was connected to two systems simultaneously, with the local system acting as
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a messenger between the user and remote system. However, the user had to com
municate with the local system when the remote system failed or the remote's in
put buffers were filled. Also there had to be some way transfer files between sys
tems; therefore, the local system had to examine each user request to determine
the action to take, requiring a way to differentiate local and remote requests. The
TELNET protocol provided these services.
TELNET's remote logon and file transfer capabilities made network use some
what easier for (but not transparent to) the user. In 1973, RSEXEC was developed.
to provide a transparent interface to the ARPANET PDP-10's that ran TENEX
[Thom73]. RSEXEC consisted of a group of programs residing at each host. The
host systems executed RSEXEC programs as user tasks. These tasks intercepted
user commands and host responses, and converted them to a standard form.
Through this mechanism, RSEXEC attempted to make the TENEX hosts appear to
be a single timeshared system. It extended the affect of user commands to all
TENEX hosts, so users did not need to know which system they were using. One
account gave access to all of the systems.
To coordinate user activity, the system maintained a profile for each user.
The profile described the user's subdirectories on each TENEX host. The profile
directories formed a composite directory listing all the files belonging to the user.
File references were checked against the composite directory; if the file was not in
the composite directory, RSEXEC requested the file from the local host.
RSEXEC also facilitated sharing of computational resources. Resident on each
host was an RSEXEC server process that communicated with the RSEXEC server
processes on the other hosts. The server was responsible for monitoring job re
quests for Its host, accepting or rejecting requests from other servers based on the
local load. Thus, resource sharing was not done at the expense of local users.
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In summary, ARPANET provided a testbed for many ideas on computer net
works. It was the first collection of diverse computers connected over long dis
tances to achieve resource sharing. Many basic concepts for communications proto
cols and communication links came out of this project. However, ARPANET was
just the beginning of user oriented network software.
By 1974 a different type of network, C.mmp, was under development at Car
negie Mellon University [Wulf74, Wulf78]. C.mmp was a homogeneous minicomput
er network. While each processor was capable of operating by itself, the memory
was shared among all the processors through a common memory switch. The kernel
software for C.mmp, Hydra, was designed to provide a flexible environment upon
which to build an operating system. Hydra provided I/O device support, capability
based protection, and limited scheduling services. Most traditional operating system
services, such as a file system, were developed by the users on the Hydra base.
Hydra represented one of the first attempts at a truly distributed operating system.
6.5.2. Growth Years - 1976 to Present
Research on network operating systems continued to develop on two divergent
paths. Hydra represented an operating system designed from its inception to con
trol a network of processors. Other network operating systems were designed to
provide network control services for computers with existing operating systems.
This second class of network operating systems are referred to as guest operating
systems.
The goal of a guest operating system is to provide a standard interface to a
variety of existing host operating systems [Kimb76]. A basic assumption made is
that the host operating systems can not be modified. Given this, the guest operat
ing system must translate user requests into a sequence of commands acceptable to
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the hosts, and it must translate host messages back into a standard form. The
network operating system is also responsible for balancing resource requirements
against the resources available, while allowing host operating systems some control
over the demands from the network. In particular, the hosts must be able to en
sure that local users are not penalized for the system's participation in the net
work.
To accomplish these goals, a guest operating system has to provide a set of
primitive functions. These functions include some form of user communication with
remote processes. Included are message processing primitives to create, forward
and coordinate messages.
Other services required are data migration functions, which allow users to
create, access and move files on remote systems. The ideal form of data migra
tion is transparent access to remote and local files. This requires a means of re
trieving records from the remote file, performing any translations required, and
reconstructing the logical record required by the user. This presents difficulties
because the network operating system must be aware of the internal structure of
the host's file system, adding an extra level of complexity. Most real systems
transfer whole files, or severely restrict the types of files supported by remote
record access.
Guest operating systems must also provide some
network job execution func
tions. The functions allow a user to run jobs on different systems in the network
and possibly execute separate job steps in
parallel on separate machines. The
specific functions required would depend on the user environment the guest
presents: transparent or user controlled network operation.
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Finally, the guest must provide some primitives to implement the network
operating system job control language (JCL). In this way, users can employ a com
mon network JCL instead of the JCL of each host. Since the guest operating sys
tem must translate its JCL into the host operating system commands, the network
operating system JCL is limited by the capabilities of the hosts on the network.
To access the full power of a given host, users have to issue commands in that
host's language.
The National Software Works (NSW), developed in 1976, represented a step
forward, as it was the first major attempt at a guest system for a heterogeneous
network. [MU177]. Unlike RSEXEC, which provided a guest operating system for
only the TENEX hosts, NSW provided a user environment for all ARPANET hosts.
NSW attempted to make the tools (programming utilities) on different hosts
available to all users as if they were on the local system. This had to be achieved
with no changes in the host operating system and with little or no modification of
the individual tools. A Foreman process at each host was responsible for host
specific details. For example, there would be a Multics Foreman to translate NSW
commands to Multics commands and vice versa.
A different version of the Foreman existed for each unique host operating
system. The Foreman acted as a spokesman for the tool, intercepting all communi
cations between the tool and the rest of the network. The Foreman delegated the
tool's requests to the appropriate network components. This allowed the output of
a tool on one system to act as the input of a tool (ala a Unix pipe) on another
system. Thus users could combine tools on various systems to perform a
particular
job.
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The project was successful in providing a program production capability
through the use of tools on diverse hosts. However, it did not provide more gen
eral forms of resource sharing, such as remote job execution or network file ser
vices. For this reason it did not achieve all the goals of a network operating sys
tem.
The next attempt at a guest operating system for the ARPANET came in
1978. The National Bureau of Standards developed XNOS, an Experimental Network
Operating System, to run on all the interactive systems on the ARPANET
[Kimb78]. XNOS was implemented in specialized processors, called Network In-
terace Modules (NIMs), that were used to interface the host machine to the net
work. The NIM handled all the communications with the network, passing to the
host only those messages directly involving it. This approach minimized the impact
of the network operating system on the host, because the network functions were
placed in a separate processor. What is more, the common code of the network
operating system, not related to the host operating system interface specifics, could
be used on each NIM without any recoding, since the NIMs were identical. Host
specific code would be developed just once for each unique host operating system.
The centralized design of the network operating system achieved through the
homogeneous nature of the NIMs reduced the projected costs, and the design facili
tated incremental expansion of the network. To add a new host, a NIM with the
host specific software would be added to the network. If the host ran the same
operating system as some host already on the system, there was no new software
required. If the host was different from all the others, the only new software was
the host specific interface to the NIM.
The XNOS user interface was also implemented on the NIM. Users logged
onto the NIM, and XNOS coordinated their interactions with the network. XNOS
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maintained a network wide directory system for each user, defining the files he
could access, where they resided on the network, and the types of access permit
ted. XNOS mapped user names in the network directory to the host system's name
for that same file. The user was unaware of the host names or internal represen
tations of his files.
XNOS supported a form of network job execution. The user specified the sys
tem he wanted to use; if necessary XNOS would transfer data files to this system,
prior to execution. Also supported was remote access, allowing run time access to
records on other systems. An XNOS translator overcame the differences between
host file structures. It was possible to set up a network job where different steps
were executed in parallel on different hosts; however the user had to explicitly set
up the job that way. To coordinate the parallel processes, XNOS supported inter
process communication across processors. The functions provided were simple signal
and wait primitives.
XNOS came closer to meeting the requirements of a network operating system
than any previous system, but it only worked with the interactive hosts on the AR
PANET, excluding the batch systems. Network operation was not totally tran
sparent to the user, as evidenced by the network job facilities. However, it did
provide a comfortable user environment for resource sharing, especially through the
network file system and common command language.
About the same time that XNOS was developed, "Carnegie Mellon University
began working on a new multiprocessor system called
Cm* (see Fig. 6-1) [Jone79,
Oust80]. Cm* consisted of multiple DEC LSI-11 processors, grouped in clusters.
Each computer in a cluster was connected through a memory switch (Slocal) to a
map bus, controlled by a Kmap. Each Kmap was a processor that mediated intra-
and inter-cluster data transfers.
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Figure 6-1
Cm* Configuration
The memory of Cm* was the union of the local memories for each processor.
The Kmap and Slocal interfaces provided access to the memory of the other pro
cessors. Because of this multilevel memory switching, there were substantial- time
penalties associated with non-local and cross-cluster memory accesses.
The first operating system for Cm* was StarOS. The nucleus consisted of
primitive functions called instructions. Instructions were short, uninterruptible
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sequences of processor commands. Much of the StarOS nucleus was implemented in
Kmap microcode; instructions not in the Kmap resided on each LSI-11 and were ex
ecutable only in the kernel mode. Since a copy of the system nucleus was kept on
every processor, the individual processors would be able to function even if part of
the system failed.
StarOS implemented a two layer scheduling system. At one level were rou
tines that determined global scheduling policies, computed job priorities, assigned
jobs to particular processors, and set the execution quantum. This scheduler was
responsible for ensuring concurrent execution of parallel processes when possible.
The Multiplexor formed the second level of the scheduling system. This pro
gram determined which process to execute next on the processor. Several low lev
el scheduling policies were possible, such as first-come, first-serve or round robin;
the policy was set at system initialization.
The concept of a task force was fundamental to the StarOS design. A task
force was a collection of many small cooperating processes, whose code and data
combined to accomplish a single task. Each of the task force processes implement
ed a specialized function, and therefore each needed access to only small amounts
of data or code. The number of active processes in a task force could vary with
the number of processors available. Some processes could be replicated and their
data partitioned; individual copies worked in parallel on a small subsets of the data.
The task force was the unit used for global scheduling and authorization for
resources in the system.
Except for the small nucleus, the operating system itself was implemented as
a task force. The processes of the operating system task force communicated with
each other through mailboxes. The body of the operating system was distributed
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over the cluster, with system processes assigned to processors by the scheduler.
Each cluster was controlled by a functionally complete operating system. Dynamic
reconfiguration of the StarOS task force allowed the system to recover from
hardware or software failures. If the hardware failed, the system processes would
be recreated on functional equipment, and if software failed the faulty process
would be destroyed and a new copy executed. This system was still under develop
ment and test as of 1980.
6.5.3. Current Activity
The Cambridge Model Distributed System (CMDS), from the University of
Cambridge, took a different approach to network software [Wilk80]. CMDS is the
network operating system for the Cambridge Digital Communications Ring shown in
Figure 6-2. CMDS provides interactive timesharing facilities to its users via the
network. The system is made up of servers and computational machines. The
servers are microcomputers that implement a specific operating system function for
all users; the computational machines are minicomputers that can be allocated to a
user upon request. Communication is accomplished by sending messages on the
ring, with each module checking all message headers for messages sent to it.
The operating system is physically as well as logically distributed. The initial
configuration has six servers providing basic services. The Name Server maps the
symbolic names for processes, servers and users to the ring addresses used in the
message headers; users are never aware of the ring addresses. The File Server is
responsible for handling all system and user file requests, and is the only processor
with access to the system disks. The Printing Server spools user output to the line
printer, and the Time Server provides time and date stamps for other servers. Fi
nally, the Boot Server is responsible for the initially loading the ring interfaces.
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The most critical portion of the system is the Resource Manager. Through it
users are granted access to the network. The user terminals are connected to con
centrators that in turn are attached to the ring; these concentrators send user au
thentication information to the Resource Manager. Once a user's identity is veri
fied, he can use the network as an interactive timesharing system. When a user
wants to run a program, he requests one of the six computational machines; the
Resource Manager arbitrates these requests. The Resource Manager can reboot the
computational machines if user software running on them fails irrecoverably.
Users are not allowed indiscriminate use of all resources on the network. A
user's privileges are maintained by the Resource Manager, who then grants access
to other servers if permitted. Other protection features are implemented in the
message handling software. Each ring station maintains a list of stations from
which it will accept messages. In this way, a station can ignore messages it does
not expect. The acceptance list for each station is maintained with the aid of the
Resource Manager.
The server approach of CMDS has advantages and disadvantages. One of the
advantages is flexibility in choosing the server functions. Any commonly used pro-
gram, such as an editor, can be implemented as a server. Once this
is done, edit
ing requests will be handled by this server. Without the editor server, editing re
quests would generate requests to the Resource Manager to allocate a computation
al machine, load the editor into the memory, and run it.
While this is transparent
to the users, it ties up computational resources and has
a long set up time.
Another advantage is that if a bottleneck develops, another copy of the server
can be added to the system. This can be done temporarily by commandeering a
computational machine, or permanently by adding another station. The latter is a
feasible approach, because the stations are inexpensive microprocessors.
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The primary disadvantage to the approach is that critical facilities are located
in single stations. If the Resource Manager or Name Server fails, the entire net
work fails. To alleviate this problem, CMDS permitted redundant critical servers.
This system is still in early stages of development, and research with it continues.
While CMDS represents one approach to the problems of network operating
system, many other techniques are being investigated. A group at MIT turned away
from the classical concepts of computer organization in their network operating
system, TRIX [Ward80]. They believed that the traditional view of memory as the
primary commodity of computers was not appropriate for implementing distributed
networks.
The basic commodity in TRIX is a stream. A stream is a full duplex path
for passing control or data messages between processes. Stream communications
are asynchronous, so a process can operate several streams at a time. All system
objects, such as files and devices, are implemented as processes attached to
streams. For example, a file appears to be a stream that responds to control mes
sages such as read, write and seek. The message semantics are associated with the
stream, rather than the mechanism at the ehd of the stream that implements them.
Programs use streams without regard to the underlying implementation.
An advantage of streams is their flexibility. For example, if new protection
services are required, processes to perform protection
protection checks can be in
serted into the path to the protected object. If data translation services are need
ed, the translation processes can be placed in
the path between the dissimilar ob
jects. Users are unaware of such changes.
Since streams separate the abstract service or object from its implementation,
it does not matter where an object or service resides. While the multiple
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processor aspects of TRIX have yet to be tested, the MIT researchers expect the
organizational structure will lend itself to network implementation.
The LOCUS system at UCLA is a recently developed network operating sys
tem [Pope81]. LOCUS is built on a local area network connecting PDP-lls on a
high speed ring. The objective is to provide a highly reliable system giving the il
lusion of a single machine.
Each computer in LOCUS is a functionally complete system; each runs the
same software, configured to account for hardware differences. In this way, if the
network is divided into disjoint pieces by a failure, the individual components can
still function. The underlying philosophy of the system is that each site is master
of its own resources, so it cannot be swamped by network requests.
One of the key components of LOCUS is the implementation of a distributed
global file system. The system provides a hierarchical name space compatible with
that of Unix. File objects in the system have a globally unique name in the hierar
chy. For example, pathnames /groupl/userl/filel and /groupl/user2/filel define two
different files, each of which appear to the owner as filel. The path associated
with user 1 is /groupl/userl/ and the path associated with user 2 is /groupl/user2/
sp there is no conflict.
The file system is logically partitioned into file groups. For each file group,
one site is arbitrarily designated the Current Synchronization Site (CSS), and is
responsible for coordinating access to all files in the group. As there may be
several copies of a file, the CSS is responsible for locating the latest version of
the file. A Storage Site (SS) is any site that has a copy of the file. For each
new file request, the CSS chooses an SS to handle the request. Each user works
with one copy of a file. Changes to the file are not made known to other users
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until the file is closed; this guarantees file consistency to each user. When a file
is closed a copy of it is distributed to all SSs with a copy. However, conflicts can
occur if a file is updated at the same time by two users. When the file is closed,
and the updates are distributed, there is problem regarding how to merge the
changes, or how to decide which copy will overwrite the other. Resolution of such
conflicts is still an open question.
Network efficiency is a primary goal of LOCUS. The penalty for non-local
access must be low so that processor without local file storage can be added.
What is more, local file access should not cost more because of the network. This
latter goal is met by bypassing the network when the using site, SS and CSS are
the same. The performance measurements for file accesses show that LOCUS has
approximately the same throughput as standard Unix when operating on local files.
For distributed files, access time is slightly longer than Unix for large block
transfers, and about twice as slow for single block transfers. These results support
the concept of using distributed processing for timesharing applications.
Distributed computing and its affect on operating systems is still a lively,
current topic. This will probably continue for many years, because the issues are
only partially understood, and they encompass so many areas of computer science.
6.6. Contributions of the Era
It is difficult to identify the contributions of this era, as it still in its early
stages of development. What will be described are techniques that have been
developed (but not fully tested), and issues that have yet to be resolved.
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6.6.1. Hardware Refinements
Most of the hardware developments for distributed computing involved com
munications equipment not related to operating systems: they will not be presented
here. Only those changes that influenced or were influenced by operating systems
design will be discussed.
Memory switches were developed to facilitate high speed methods of commun
ications among closely coupled processors. Multilevel switching mechanisms like
those found in Cm* are available, as well as simple multiport memories, that allow
multiple processors to access a single bank of memory locations in a controlled
way.
Various methods of connecting the processors were developed to accommodate
different approaches to network software. The earliest distributed network, AR
PANET, used common carrier facilities available through the phone company.
These facilities were slow and subject to data transmission errors. Such low
bandwidth would not be acceptable in a system like the Cambridge Ring, which
used the network to implement an interactive timesharing facility. Local networks
require higher speed, more reliable communications links.
The need to reduce operating system overhead associated with communications
protocols led to the development of intelligent communications devices. There are
many network interfaces that will handle the physical and data link functions:
detection of errors, requests for retransmission, and the formatting and ordering of
message packets. These reduce the overhead associated with standard network
operations.
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6.6.2. Software Refinements
Network operating systems are still in their infancy. Unlike many other areas
in operating systems, little has been firmly established. However, there are a
variety of approaches to network operating systems, each with its own set of ad
vantages and disadvantages. These will be presented here.
Networks can be classified as loosely coupled or closely coupled. In a loosely
coupled system the nodes are independent units, but they can cooperate to achieve
larger goals. The user is aware that the network exists, and has facilities available
to make the network work for him. The primary design questions in a loosely cou
pled system are the allowable levels of sharing, and the degree to which users are
shielded from the host specific features.
A closely coupled system is one in which the nodes normally work together to
achieve a common goal. The users are a single community to be serviced, rather
distinct groups associated with specific machines. In a closely coupled system,
there are many policy choices regarding the relationship among the processors. The
operating system can be server oriented, with certain functions residing only on dif
ferent machines. Alternatively, the system can be controlled by a master, with
other processors acting as slaves; or all processors can be equals. These are some
examples of the issues in the design of a closely coupled system.
Network operating systems can be broadly classified as guest and non-guest
systems. A non-guest system runs directly on the hardware with no intermediary
software. A guest coexists with a host operating system, working with it to pro
vide network services.
Guests are developed to preserve the investment in existing host operating
systems and the associated software, while allowing a network to be built. The
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problems associated with designing a guest relate to interactions with existing
software. The host operating systems will have their own file systems, command
languages, protection mechanisms, and internal structures; these can vary
dramatically. The network designers are constrained by the limitations imposed by
the hosts in the network. Most guest systems to date either limit the range of
capabilities over different hosts, or they are operate on a single type of host.
In any network implementation, the effects of the number of different com
puter types must be considered. Homogeneous networks are easier to design and
implement, as there are fewer variables involved. However, they are not practical
in many instances, since the machines to be included in the network already exist.
Heterogeneous systems present more difficulties when the hardware or software ar
chitectures differ significantly. Fundamental problems can occur, that are not easi
ly resolvable, for example inadequate hardware support for the protection mechan
isms. One method used to get around some of the problems presented by hetero
geneous systems is to implement the network functions on a front-end processor
that acts as an intermediary for the host on the network.
A difficult issue in distributed software involves the treatment of files. Gen
eral questions arise regarding the types of accesses allowed on remotely stored
files. In a network wide file system, synchronization is a key problem if duplicate
copies of files are kept. Conflicts can occur when updating duplicate files, and
problems resulting from partitioning the network need to be resolved. Some of
these problems stem from a more basic problem caused by the time delays inherent
in distributed systems. The problem is that it is not possible for any processor to
know the state of the entire network at the time it has to make decisions. The
state of the system could have changed between the time a processor checked on
the status of some resource and the time it allocates that resource to a user.
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7. Summary
Computer science is a very young field. In the 30 years that computers have
been in existence, the field has changed dramatically. Because of this it is diffi
cult to follow all the developments, and to correctly identify the factors influenc
ing them. This is especially true in the recent years, because the effects of the
research are as yet unknown.
What has been presented is a selective history of the development of one area
of computer science: operating systems. The topics discussed represent major
themes that pervaded the professional literature of the time. These topics have
been identified as multiprogramming, virtual memory, security and protection, and
distributed processing systems. Multiprogramming systems were a major research
area from the late 1950's through the late 1960s. Virtual memory systems dom
inated the late 1960s through the middle 1970s. Security and protection, and dis
tributed systems whose origins are in the 1960s and 1970s, are still being
researched, and will be for many years to come. Figure 7-1 summarizes the timing
of the major developments for each subject area.
There are major subjects which have contributed to operating system design
that have been knowingly omitted. Some of these are the development of file sys
tems, synchronization and program methodology. While these would require discus
sion in an exhaustive history of operating systems, they are beyond the scope of
this thesis.
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Year Early Multiprogramming Virtual Memory Security Distributed
1950- Assemblers
1955 symbolic addressing
1956 simple supervisors
interrupts
1957 batch systems GAMMA-60
TX-2
multiprocessors
1958
1959 Strachey overlays
1960
1961 Atlas
H800
Atlas
B5000
Atlas
1962 CTSS CTSS
1963
1964 TSS
1965 Multics Multics
1966 Object Model
1967
1968 THE W.S. Model
Belady
1969 Lampson
1970 Denning Virt. Mach. ARPANET
1971
1972
1973 RSEXEC
1974 Security
kernels
UCLA-VM
MITRE
C.mmp
1975
1976 NSW
1977
1978
,
-
Unix security
KSOS
PSOS
XNOS
Cm*
1979
1980 CMDS
Trix
1981 Locus
Figure 7-1
Summary of Major Developments
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centrates on the use of encryption to achieve security.
16. G. Popek, et al.; "UCLA Secure Unix"; Proceedings of the National Com
puter Conference, 1979; AFIPS Press
This article describes the security kernel for Unix built at
UCLA; there is some discussion of its potential use in a net
work.
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